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ABSTRACT 
The National Network of Fusion Centers (the Network) is one of many organizational 
efforts the nation has undergone to help bolster its counterterrorism prevention and 
response efforts. Since its creation in the years following the 9/11 attacks, the Network 
has garnered both accolades and criticisms, resulting in an uneven opinion about fusion 
center functions and performance. The diverse opinions that are held of the Network 
appear at times to be based on perceptions incongruent with some of the realities of 
current Network operations and which lead to an undervaluation of its contributions.  
This research examined the points of opposition between supporters and critics of 
the Network and identified strategies employed by the Network to mitigate areas of 
concern, in order to define the relationship or gap between actual performance and the 
perception of performance of the Network held by external (to the Network) parties. This 
research employed a modified version of the multi-goal policy analysis method as a guide 
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State and major urban area fusion centers became one of the many organizational 
innovations to the United States’ national security arsenal after the attacks on 9/11. These 
entities were designed to aid the nation in combating terrorism through analysis, 
operations, and information sharing. Many of these fusion centers have evolved over time 
to support broader public safety efforts in the response and recovery mission of man-
made and natural threats. Fusion centers, collectively referred to as the National Network 
of Fusion Centers or simply the Network, have matured over the last decade, their 
operations have not escaped the national discourse on domestic intelligence activities. 
Assessments, studies, and opinions concerning the Network’s functions, capabilities, 
responsibilities, and overall value, have resulted in positive and negative reviews, which 
create perceptions about the organization. This thesis aimed to identify and determine 
which of these perceptions were accurate and to what degree others were erroneous. The 
following research also attempted to identify and analyze the uneven views of the 
Network in order to highlight areas where the Network should consider focusing its 
collective efforts to increase external support and expedite the organization’s maturation 
process. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) describes a fusion center as 
“primary focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, 
gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among federal, state, local, tribal, and 
territorial (SLTT) partners.”1 From a state and local government perspective, fusion 
centers are viewed as key assets serving as a force multiplier for all levels of government 
in the threat arena. These centers are seen by the federal government to be important 
partners that help the nation achieve long-term security by enabling the government to 
execute the National Security Strategy.2 
                                                 
1. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Fact Sheet Page,” accessed May 15, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet. 
2. Office of the President of the United States, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
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The fusion center network consists of 78 federally recognized fusion centers that 
are located in a majority of the states and United States territories.3 These centers are 
owned and operated by state, local, and territorial organizations. Many centers receive 
federal support in the form of funding, training, federal personnel, technical assistance, 
exercise support, technology, and other resources to enhance the organization’s 
capabilities. The organizational structure and staffing at each center is unique due to the 
differing priorities that are influenced by the threat environment of that center’s area of 
responsibility. Some of the centers have a significant number of personnel assigned to 
them and others are smaller task forces.  
The National Strategy for Information Sharing highlighted fusion centers as 
integral players in support of homeland security and combating terrorism.4 From this 
point forward, fusion centers were seen by the federal government as the primary touch 
points at state and local level for receipt, dissemination, and harvesting of threat and 
intelligence information. The Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) in 
collaboration with DHS and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) developed the 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers in order to establish 
common operating principles which all centers could build their capabilities to.5  
In 2010, the baseline capabilities were distilled into four critical operating 
capabilities (COC) and four enabling capabilities (EC) intended to highlight the most 
crucial elements that a center needed to achieve in order to support the Network.6 The 
COCs were identified as the fusion center’s ability to receive information from federal 
partners, to analyze threat information, to disseminate information to stakeholders, and to 
                                                 
3. “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
accessed June 29, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information. 
4. Office of the President of the United States, National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes 
and Challenges In Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing (Washington, DC: White House, 
2007), 3  http://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/National_Strategy_for_Information_Sharing.pdf. 
5. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers: A 
Supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2008), 
https://it.ojp.gov/gist/Files/
baseline%20capabilities%20for%20state%20and%20major%20urban%20area%20fusion%20centers0.pdf. 
6. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Fact Sheet Page.” 
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gather threat information from partners in their area of operations.7 The EC were defined 
as privacy, civil rights, and civil liberty (P/CRCL) protections, sustainment strategy, 
communications and outreach, and security.8  
One of the strengths of the Network is its direct connections with a variety of 
entities from all levels of government and the private sector. These connections are often 
in the form of personnel being assigned or detailed to the center from their parent 
organization. The detailed individuals provide the centers with expertise from an array of 
disciplines that enables the centers to gain that discipline’s perspectives. Fusion centers 
also benefit from the assignee’s organizational contacts and partnerships by in effect, 
assuming those organizational relationships. These relationships and connections enable 
the fusion center network to execute its mission of sharing and gathering information.  
Criticisms about the Network’s value, performance, and ability to conduct its 
fundamental missions have been fed by perceptions often based on erroneous or dated 
information no longer relevant to the argument. The items which research revealed have 
been the most commonly identified as areas of concern related to Network are 
administration, analysis, information sharing, organizational mission, as well as P/CRCL.  
Administration consists of fusion center oversight and governance bodies, 
organizational management structure, fusion center composition, as well as the 
Network’s operating authorities and statutes. In some cases, the fusion centers have been 
viewed as a lawless body that lacks central oversight from opponents and potentially does 
not understand that each of the centers reside in different legal jurisdictions.9 Other 
claims have been made that leadership has willingly used these blurry lines of authority 
in order to apply only parts of the law that conform to the organization’s intent.10  
                                                 
7. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Annual Fusion Center Assessment and Gap Mitigation 
Activities,” accessed March 31, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/annual-fusion-center-assessment-and-gap-
mitigation-activities. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Mike German and Jay Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? (New York: American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf, 
9–10. 
10. Ibid., 10.  
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Analysis concerns the ability of fusion centers to vet incoming tips and leads, 
process this raw data, and apply recently received data with other relevant information in 
order to make a tactical or strategic assessment of the information concerned. Analytical 
products generated by the Network have often been cited as being of little value or 
focusing on non-priority items.11  
The information sharing category contains elements that deal the capacity of the 
Network to provide information, intelligence, to partner organizations. This also includes 
the dissemination of requests for information (RFI) and general awareness items where 
the fusion center may be requesting information from partners. Common concerns raised 
in this area were cited as product timeliness, redundancy, and at times, lack of delivery to 
some jurisdictions.12  
Mission is comprised of the overall focus of the fusion center, the priority 
information requirements of the entity, as well as how the fusion center views its key 
contributions to the national security effort. Arguments that have been voiced about the 
Network in this category have centered on concerns about the migration from 
counterterrorism focus to all-crimes and all-hazards approaches.13  
The P/CRCL category consists of the Network’s transparency and the general 
view of the fusion centers level of commitment to support constitutionally mandated and 
implied right and liberties. Many of the fears and concerns raised about the Network in 
                                                 
11. Brian Michael Jenkins, Andrew Liepman, and Henry H. Willis, Identifying Enemies among Us 
(Washington, DC: Rand Corporation, 2014), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
conf_proceedings/CF300/CF317/RAND_CF317.pdf, 8–9, 12. 
12. U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Federal Support for and Involvement in 
State and Local Fusion Centers, Majority and Minority Staff Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 2012), 
http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/100312cc1.pdf, 3; Jenkins, Liepman, and Willis, 
Identifying Enemies among Us, 9; Jerome P. Bjelopera, Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide 
Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2011), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/166837.pdf, 16. 
13. Robert W. Taylor and Amanda L. Russell, “The Failure of Police Fusion Centers and the Concept 
of a National Intelligence Sharing Plan,” Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 13, no. 2 
(2012): 186, doi: 10.1080/15614263.2011.581448. 
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this category have often consisted of collection of information concerning lawful citizen 
activity, and ambiguous reasonable suspicion definitions.14  
This study determined that some elements of the above-mentioned category were 
based on items that have been identified by the Network. In some cases, the Network had 
implemented mitigation strategies and policies (as in the case of P/CRCL) or had altered 
operations in attempts to correct or improve operations. In other areas, criticisms were 
based on items beyond the control of the Network, such as the differing legal 
jurisdictions between state and local boundaries. (Table 1 provides an overview of 
perceptions of the Network.) 
                                                 




Network Perception Summary 
Elements Description Criticisms Analysis 
Administration The Network governance, 
oversight, authorities, 
discipline culture, and 
overall management 
factors. 
The Network consists 
of inconsistent and 
decentralized 
management structure 
and lacks external 
oversight 
Jurisdictional boundaries 
and lines of authority 
prevent a single 
centralized command. A 
majority of components 




One of the Network’s 
primary business functions 
is to conduct thoughtful and 
meaningful intelligence 









Many products are too 
general and of low 
value to the consumer. 
Analytical capacity is 
increasing. Strategic 
intelligence is often not 
useful to tactically driven 
consumers. Unrealistic 
consumer expectations 
stem from lack of 
understanding of the 
intent of products. 
Information 
Sharing 
The Network’s ability to 
inform and connect partner 
agencies with information 
to guide operations and 
decision making. 
The Network often 
shares information 
that is redundant and 
not timely. At times 
information 
overwhelms the 




are now in place to 
formalize the sharing 




of feedback, and 
consistent timely vetting 
of data. 
Mission Organizational focus of 
fusion centers, prioritization 
of competing requirements, 
as well as the organization’s 
self-view of its 
responsibilities 
The Network lacks a 
strategic view and has 
migrated from a 
terrorism focus to all-




An all-hazards approach 
encompasses terrorism 
and increases support 
from external agencies 
enhancing the Network’s 
overall capabilities. 
Privacy, Civil 
Rights, and Civil 
Liberties 
The Network’s 
transparency and ability to 
execute protections for 
citizen privacy, civil rights, 
and civil liberties 
The Network lacks 
transparency, is a risk 
to individual P/CRCL, 
and operates on broad 
definitions of SAR 
and reasonable 
suspicion. 
The entire Network 
recently attained 
integrated P/CRCL 
policies across the nation, 
but has struggled with 
turnover and completion 
of updated compliance 
reviews. 
Table 1. Network Perception Summary 
 xxi
This study resulted in three recommendations that the National Network of Fusion 
Centers can consider in order to improve its public perceptions as well as aid in 
determining the organization’s strategic direction. The Network should consider 
implementing a marketing strategy, creating a national strategy for the Network, and 
should increase its capacity to conduct strategic analysis while maintaining its ability to 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States identified many intelligence and law enforcement gaps which were 
exploited by a foreign terrorist organization through the 9/11 hijackers.1 This report led to 
the eventual establishment of 78 state and major urban area fusion centers, collectively 
known as the National Network of Fusion Centers, or simply the Network.2 These fusion 
centers were designed to function “as primary focal points within the state and local 
environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information 
among federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners.”3 From a state and 
local government perspective, the Network is viewed as a key asset serving as a force 
multiplier for all levels of government in the information sharing arena.4 The federal 
government looks at the Network as a relevant trusted partner helping the nation achieve 
long-term security by enabling the government to execute the National Security 
Strategy.5  
During this maturation process requiring increases in capabilities, the Network 
has experienced developmental stagnation, integration challenges, programmatic growing 
pains, budget pressures, and changes in scope of responsibility—all of which have 
                                                 
1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York, NY: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2004). 
2. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information,” 
accessed June 29, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information.  
3. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Fact Sheet Page,” accessed May 15, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet.  
4. Charles Clark, “Defenders of Fusion Centers Hit Back at Senate Panel’s Criticisms,” Government 
Executive. October 9, 2012, http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2012/10/defenders-fusion-centers-hit-
back-senate-panels-criticisms/58652/; Robert O’Harrow Jr., “Homeland Security’s Fusion Centers 
Defended in Response to Sharply Critical Senate Report,” The Washington Post, October 3, 2012, 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-03/world/35499416_1_fusion-centers-law-enforcement-
intelligence-reports. 
5. Office of the President of the United States, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
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unsurprisingly led to uneven performance across the Network and over time. A few 
examples of this are that some fusion centers have been accused of being involved with 
privacy violations, others have had difficulties in demonstrating analytic proficiency, and 
many fusion centers have been accused of mission creep. A lack of understanding of the 
Network’s missions, priorities, and direction among stakeholders, the general public, and 
external decision makers may have also fed into assumptions and charges of 
wrongdoing.6 External influences, such as the Great Recession and the passage of time 
since an event on the scale of 9/11, have also diminished the felt need to support all of the 
post-9/11 terrorism initiatives to the same extent as in the past.7  
These factors have resulted in accolades and criticisms from observers leading to 
the creation of a national debate on the Network’s performance.8 The diverse opinions of 
the Network appear to, at times, be based on perceptions that are not congruent with the 
realities of current Network operations and often lead to an underestimation of its 
achievements and contributions. Examination of the Network’s strengths and weaknesses 
is necessary to determine if adjustments to performance, perceptions, or both are 
necessary to achieve a more accurate view of the Network. 
Common areas that have received a litany of contradicting comments from fusion 
center supporters and detractors are core to the functions of the Network and can be 
grouped into the categories of administration, analysis (information), information sharing, 
mission, and privacy. Administration concerns items involved with fusion center 
governance, oversight, authorities, discipline culture, and overall management factors. 
Analysis largely focuses on a fusion center’s capacity to conduct thoughtful and 
                                                 
6. Mike German and Jay Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? (New York, NY: American 
Civil Liberties Union, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/privacy/
fusioncenter_20071212.pdf, 9. 
7. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Recession of 2007–2009: BLS Spotlight on Statistics the 
Recession of 2007–2009 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/
2012/recession/; Susan Hocevar, Gail Thomas, and Erik Jansen, Building Collaborative Capacity: An 
Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2006), 15, 22. 
8. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Senate Report Says National Intelligence Fusion Centers Have Been Useless,” 
Foreign Policy, October 3, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/03/
senate_report_says_national_intelligence_fusion_centers_have_been_useless?page=0, 1. 
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meaningful intelligence analysis that supports stakeholder requirements. Information 
sharing consists of the ability to inform and connect partner agencies with information to 
guide operations and decision making. Mission refers to the organizational focus of the 
entity, prioritization of competing requirements, as well as the organization’s self-view of 
its responsibilities. Privacy covers the Network’s transparency and ability to execute 
protections for citizen privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.  
The Network represents no small investment in the defense of the homeland yet 
its functions, execution, and value continue to be questioned and discussed. The ongoing 
debate, is fueled by perceptions that may be out of proportion to reality, has plagued 
Network leaders and partners by creating an environment where it has been hard to 
accurately define or demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the Network. 
Examination of perceptions and realities measured against mitigation efforts currently in 
place will highlight their relationships and define areas in Network policy, which are 
deficient and identify emerging areas that may present future challenges to the 
organization. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. What are Fusion Centers? 
State and major urban area fusion centers are one of the newest organizational 
developments designed to take a collaborative approach to combating terrorism. Though 
they started out combatting terrorism, many of these fusion centers have evolved over 
time to support governmental efforts to respond react to, and recover from man-made and 
natural threats.9 The expansion of these organizations and maturation of their capabilities 
has created a robust information sharing network.10 This network has proven effective at 
bridging the divide between different levels of government as well as diverse 
                                                 
9. Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress 
(CRS Report No. RL34070) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 
https://opencrs.com/document/RL34070/2007-07-06/, 2. 
10. Bart Johnson, “Fusion Centers: Strengthening the Nation’s Homeland Security Enterprise,” The 
Police Chief 78, no. 2 (2011), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/
index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article_id=2315&issue_id=22011, 62. 
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organizations normally separated by jurisdictional or discipline boundaries.11 The 
Network has relied on several factors that contributed to its creation, evolution, and 
success.  
Congress defines a fusion center as:  
A collaborative effort of two or more federal, state, local, or tribal 
government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information 
with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, 
investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.12  
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) describes a fusion center as 
“primary focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, 
gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among federal and SLTT partners.”13 
DHS has also stated that the Network has proven effective at bridging the divide between 
different levels of government as well as diverse organizations normally separated by 
jurisdictional or discipline boundaries.14  
The Network consists of seventy-eight federally recognized fusion centers which 
have locations in a majority of the United States and territories.15 (Figure 1 highlights the 
locations of the fusion centers that collectively make up the Network.) These centers are 
owned and operated by state, local, and territorial organizations. Many centers receive 
federal support in the form of funding, training, federal personnel, technical assistance, 
exercise support, technology, and other resources to enhance the organization’s 
capabilities.16 The specific organizational structure and staffing at each center is unique 
due to differing priorities that are influenced by the threat environment of that center’s 
                                                 
11. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Success Stories,” accessed March 15, 
2014, http://ipv6.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1296488620700.shtm#2 
12. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110–53, § 511, 121 
Stat. 317, 318–324 (2007), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ53/pdf/PLAW-110publ53.pdf. 
13. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Fact Sheet Page.”  
14 Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Success Stories.”  
15. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information.” 
16. Fiscal Year 2013 FEMA Budget Request, Statement to Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
Committee on Appropriations U.S. House of Representatives (2012) (statement by W. Ross Ashley III, 
Executive Director, National Fusion Center Association), 1–8, http://appropriations.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ap15-rashley-20120307.pdf. 
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area of responsibility. Some of the centers have a significant number of personnel 
assigned to them while others are small task force-like units. 
 
Figure 1.  Map of the National Network of Fusion Centers17 
Fusion centers provide direct connections with a variety of entities from all levels 
of government.18 These connections are often in the form of personnel being assigned or 
detailed to the center from their parent organization. The detailed individuals provide the 
centers with expertise from an array of disciplines that enables the centers to gain that 
discipline’s perspectives.19 Fusion centers also benefit from the assignee’s organizational 
contacts and partnerships by, in effect, assuming those organizational relationships. 
                                                 
17. Department of Homeland Security, Map of the National Network of Fusion Centers (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013).   
18. Fiscal Year 2013 FEMA Budget Request, 1. 
19. Walter Smith, “Developing a Model Fusion Center to Enhance Information Sharing” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 3. 
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These relationships and connections enable the fusion center network to execute its 
mission of sharing and gathering information.  
2. Factors That Have Contributed to the Network’s Development 
Several factors have contributed to the establishment and maturation of the 
Network. Previous terrorist attacks against the homeland were the impetus that 
demonstrated the need to collaborate with others.20 Unified efforts by partner 
organizations to define structure, roles, shared mission space, and guiding principles, are 
some items which have aided in the Network’s development process.21 Lastly, the 
Network’s progress has relied on the development and use of trusted partnerships which 
act as the mortar to the bricks of the Network.22 
a. Shared Priorities 
While the United States has suffered from its share of attacks such as the 1993 
attack against the World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City bombing, federal 
government policy has focused more on conventional threats.23 The attacks against the 
U.S. on 9/11 brought the subject of terrorism to the forefront of the national security 
agenda.24 Analysis of the events on 9/11 revealed a breakdown in information sharing 
                                                 
20. Charles Perrow, “The Disaster after 9/11: The Department of Homeland Security and the 
Intelligence Reorganization,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 1 (2006): 4–5, 
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=2.1.3    
21. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and 
Intelligence in a New Era (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2006), http://it.ojp.gov/
documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf, 1–2.  
22. Thomas Souchek, “Fusion Centers and Public-Private Collaboration,” Information Sharing 
Environment Blog, July 8, 2011, http://ise.gov/blog/major-thomas-souchek/fusion-centers-and-public-
private-collaboration.  
23. “First Strike: Global Terror in America,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed March 12, 
2014, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608; “Terror Hits Home: The 
Oklahoma City Bombing,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed March 12, 2014, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing; “Counter Terrorism: Rice V. 
Clarke,” The Patriot Post, accessed March 14, 2014, http://patriotpost.us/pages/176; “Bush Ignored 
Terrorism before 9/11,” Rense.com, March 25, 2004, http://rense.com/general50/bushr.htm. 
24. “9/11 Attacks,” History.com, accessed March 14, 2014, http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-
attacks; Office of the President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America (Washington, DC: White House, 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/
2002/. 
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across all levels of government, which lead to a collective focus on looking at ways to get 
accurate information to the right individuals.25  
One proposal, originating at the state and local law enforcement level, was the 
development of fusion centers. Many disciplines executed and participated in models that 
attempted to bring individuals together from different organizations prior to this with 
success. Law enforcement had participated in task forces which focused on specific 
topics since at least the 1970 for items such as counternarcotics operations.26 These 
organizations were generally less robust, viewed as temporary operations, or seen as 
entities that could surge on a specific issue. In spite of successes, most task forces would 
never be viewed prior to 9/11 as permanent solutions to focus on an entire discipline due 
to funding constraints, fear of information being compromised by another agency, and 
even mission competition between agencies.27 
Post-9/11, those concerns were secondary; organizations understood the threat 
and realized that they would not be able to accomplish their security missions without 
assistance from partner organizations. Different organizations at that time had developed 
a felt need to collaborate with others in order to find success.28 If task force collaboration 
worked to achieve success for individual issues in the past, the emerging view was that 
permanent organizational task forces or fusion centers would be a potential solution in 
the effort to secure the homeland.  
The concern to prevent another 9/11 at state and local government levels provided 
the motivation for organizations to commit to long-term support of fusion centers. The 
federal government’s shared concern was demonstrated in federal resource investments in 
                                                 
25. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 
71–107.  
26. “DEA Programs: State and Local Task Forces,” Drug Enforcement Administration, accessed 
March 12, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/dea/ops/taskforces.shtml.  
27. Laura Sullivan, “Tradition of Secrecy, Turf Wars Hinders Intelligence Agencies,” The Baltimore 
Sun, October 13, 2001, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2001-10-13/news/0110130276_1_databases-lists-
of-people-enforcement-agencies; Vincent Henry, The COMPSTAT Paradigm: Management and 
Accountability in Policing Business and the Public Sector (Flushing, NY: Looseleaf Law Productions Inc. 
2003), http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No68/No68_12VE_Henry2.pdf, 309. 
28. Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen, Building Collaborative Capacity, 15, 22.  
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the form of grants, equipment, and personnel.29 The bottom line is that an event like 9/11 
was a necessary catalyst that caused terrorism to become priority, funding to be released 
to prevent future attacks, and agencies to recognize that collaboration was a key to 
counterterrorism success. 
b. Collaboration Structures 
Another factor that has contributed to the success of the Network is the 
formulation of what Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas describe as collaboration structures.30 
Sustainment of the fusion center network required the development of a framework that 
all partnering agencies could collectively support. To accomplish this, each organization 
had to feel that it was being heard, its needs were being met, and that it was moving in a 
direction that each viewed as advantageous to its individual missions. 
The 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing highlighted fusion centers as 
integral stakeholders in support of homeland security and combating terrorism.31 From 
this point forward, fusion centers were increasingly seen by the federal government as 
one of the primary organizations at state and local levels for receipt, dissemination, and 
harvesting of threat and intelligence information. This increased engagement between the 
federal government and the fusion centers. 
The development of the network structure was backed by policy created by a joint 
committee consisting of representatives from state, local, and federal levels of 
government. The Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global), in collaboration 
with DHS and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), developed the documents Fusion 
Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers in order to establish common operating principles that all centers could build 
                                                 
29. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Fact Sheet Page.” 
30. Susan Page Hocevar, Erik Jansen, and Gail Fann Thomas, “Inter-Organizational Collaboration: 
Addressing the Challenge,” The 9/11 Essays, Homeland Security Affairs 7 (2011, September), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37884, 3. 
31. White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing, 3, 8, 14, and 20. 
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their capabilities upon.32 These capabilities have become the evaluating criteria on which 
the annual fusion center assessments have been based since the first assessments were 
conducted in 2010.33 These guidelines and baseline capabilities were accepted as the 
blueprint for moving the Network to levels of greater success.  
This framework highlighted core capabilities that would, in essence, enable 
individual fusion centers to work more efficiently with each other. It also formally 
integrated this new network into the national domestic efforts. These shared operating 
principles enabled the above to be accomplished in a way that remained flexible to 
individual fusion centers accounting for unique local or state focus areas. The 
development of collaboration structures provided stakeholders with a broad view of 
organizational structure, understanding of the needed capabilities, agreement on 
performance measurements, and a clearer picture of operational expectations. 
c. Partnerships 
Shared priorities and emphasis on the creation of collaborative structures aided in 
the establishment of the Network, but the development of partnerships inside individual 
fusion centers and between fusion centers ensures the continued success of the Network. 
As mentioned above, fusion centers consist of a variety of personnel from a number of 
different organizations and disciplines.34 It is the individuals participating in the fusion 
centers and the fusion centers themselves that form the Network and enables it to provide 
strategic value to national security.  
                                                 
32. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) serves as a 
Federal Advisory Committee to the U.S. Attorney General on critical justice information sharing initiatives. 
Global promotes standards-based electronic information exchange to provide justice and public safety 
communities with timely, accurate, complete, and accessible information in a secure and trusted 
environment. Global is administered by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau 
of Justice Assistance. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, and Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines; Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Bureau of Justice Assistance, Baseline Capabilities 
(Washington, DC: Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative).  
33. “2010 Baseline Capabilities Assessment of Fusion Centers and Critical Operational Capabilities 
Gap Mitigation Strategy,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed March 19, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/2010-baseline-capabilities-assessment-fusion-centers-and-critical-operational-
capabilities-gap.  
34. Smith, “Developing a Model Fusion Center,” 3.  
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Some of these organizations brought historical jurisdictional turf war issues to the 
table, such as the famous conflicts between the New York Police Department and New 
York Fire Department.35 Differing discipline-specific approaches to similar problems 
were also challenges. Butler et al. highlight an example of this when describing public 
health and law enforcement’s different approaches to investigating bioterrorism 
investigations.36 Many of these conflicts stemmed from competitions for funding, 
misunderstanding of external agency responsibilities, discipline specific approaches, and 
arguments over mission space.  
In their article titled “Inter-Organizational Collaboration: Addressing the 
Challenge,” Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas mention that one element of collaborative 
success is social capital.37 This is demonstrated in the partnerships that over time have 
bolstered trust between individuals and agencies resulting in collaboration as the output. 
The shared strategic vision of the individuals and fusion centers supported by a 
framework that defines expectations were enabling elements in the forming of these 
partnerships. 
Joint training, planning, analysis, and investigation at fusion center level has aided 
in the development of the required professional and social relationships.38 These joint 
endeavors have bred the beliefs between Network partners that the individuals and 
centers have a level of competency, integrity, concern for the Network, and reliability 
which are necessary to building trust according to Mishra. This trust has lead to 
successful outcomes such as the arrest of a murder suspect in Virginia after collaboration 
                                                 
35. Sarah Wallace, “Critics Say NYPD, FDNY Conflicts Still a Problem,” Firehouse, May 20, 2004, 
http://www.firehouse.com/news/10519102/critics-say-nypd-fdny-conflicts-still-a-problem.  
36. Jay Butler et al., “Collaboration between Public Health and Law Enforcement Paradigms and 
Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 8, no. 10 (2002): 
1153, http://origin.glb.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/forensic_epidemiology/Additional%20Materials/Articles/
Butler%20et%20al.pdf.  
37. Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas, “Inter-Organizational Collaboration,” 3. 
38. Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Terrorism Prevention Exercise Program,” accessed 
March 14, 2013, http://www.it.ojp.gov/docdownloader.aspx?ddid=1374; U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers Concept 
of Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), http://www.fas.org/irp/
agency/dhs/conops.pdf, 17. 
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between the Georgia Information Sharing & Analysis Center and the Virginia Fusion 
Center (VFC).39 
The Network consists of an arrangement of fusion centers which support receipt, 
dissemination, analysis, and collection of information concerning homeland security. 
This grouping of separate organizations is based on a network model which is guided by 
the collective thought that a network should be greater than the sum of its parts. The key 
elements that enhanced the development of the Network are shared priorities, 
establishment of a collaborative structure, as well as the development of trusted 
relationships. If any of these factors were absent, the Network may not have been able to 
achieve the structural integrity that is present today. 
d. Overview of Areas of Inconsistent Perceptions 
The Network has suffered from uneven perceptions which have led to a space that 
creates confusion about its operations. This confusion may contribute to inaccuracies that 
could taint the discourse concerning domestic intelligence activities and the specific 
performance of fusion centers. The areas which are most commonly examined and 
criticized are related to Network administration, analysis, information sharing, mission, 
as well as individual privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties (P/CRCL).  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research on the policy, functions, and operations of the Network identified the 
relationships between the actual performance and the perception of performance of the 
Network held by external (to the Network) parties. This study determined that 
recalibrations of these perceptions are required in order to provide a more accurate view 
of the Network. 
 
                                                 
39. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Success Stories.” 
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1. Primary Research Question 
The primary research question attempted to explain: 
 How does the Network’s actual strengths and weaknesses correlate with 
external (non-network) party perceptions of these? 
2. Supporting Research Questions 
In order to address the primary research question, this research intended to resolve 
several supporting questions: 
 What are the current strengths and weaknesses of the Network?  
 To what extent are those strengths and weaknesses accurately perceived or 
understood among stakeholders? 
 What are the consequences of any misalignment between the real and the 
perceived views of the Network’s strengths and weaknesses?  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Object of Study 
This research attempted to examine the points of misalignment between 
supporters and critics of the Network and identify strategies employed by the fusion 
centers to mitigate areas of concern in order to define the relationship between actual 
performance and the perception of performance of the Network held by external (to the 
Network) parties. While examples of policy and practice from individual fusion centers 
were reviewed and referenced to illuminate specific criteria, the focal point for this 
project’s findings and angle of inquiry focus on Network-level results and outcomes. This 
study sought to determine if a recalibration of these perceptions are required in order to 
provide a more accurate view of the Network. 
2. Selection Criteria 
Analysis of policies, practices, and criticisms centered on those items directed at 
federally recognized fusion centers which collectively make up the Network.40 This 
                                                 
40. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information.” 
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sample selection consists of seventy-eight different fusion centers which operate 
independently, but are linked by strategic policy, broad operational objectives, and 
overarching mission. These fusion centers have met the Information Sharing Guidance 
Federal Resource Allocation Criteria which requires each center to adhere to certain 
designation, oversight, certification, implementation, and capability requirements in order 
to obtain federal recognition.41  
3. Study Limitations 
 This inquiry sought data addressing the seventy-eight federally recognized 
fusion centers.42 Information which addresses similar organizations which 
are not formerly identified as an element of the Network such as federal 
coordinating bodies, emergency operations center, intelligence operational 
units, and the like, were not factored into the dataset unless it could be 
reasonably determined to have direct relevance to the Network. 
 Findings of research were limited to the identification of gaps, challenges, 
and potential opportunities for continued advancement that applies to the 
collective network. Items uncovered and identified as isolated or 
associated with specific fusion centers were not considered for analysis 
unless it is was deemed of significant value for the Network writ large. 
 Topical areas of comparison and analysis were grouped into the following 
categories: administration, analysis, information sharing, mission, and 
privacy.  
 Data collected and reviewed originated from published books, open source 
information, studies, published surveys, and organizational reports in 
which many focused on the performance and background of Network. No 
current data is available that focuses on the differences in perceptions 
about the Network or individual fusion centers. Individual or group 
surveys executed by this author focusing specifically on perceptions of the 
Network were not conducted as a mechanism for data collection. 
 Research findings concerning the causal relationships between perceptions 
and the Network are bound due to lack of empirical data on the specific 
subject. Research lacked study designed to control for, normalize, and 
otherwise manipulate all of the potential variables that contribute or 
impact perception. 
                                                 
41. Kshemendra N. Paul, Information Sharing Guidance Federal Resource Allocation Criteria (ISE-G-
112) (Washington, DC: Information Sharing Environment, 2011), https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/
RAC_final.pdf, 1–4. 
42. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information.” 
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4. Instrumentation 
Sources of data to support this inquiry and analysis consist of primary and 
secondary sources of published literature. Primary sources refer to documents which are 
generally created from direct data collection and analysis such as policy generation 
workgroups, surveys, or original research studies conducted by the authoring body. 
Secondary sources often use third party data derived from primary documents in order to 
inform its findings and analysis. The data is further divided into the topical categories of 
framework/guidelines, review/assessments/critiques, supplementary-marketing/branding 
and supplementary-Network 
The first category of literature focuses on guidelines, governing documents and 
policy relating to fusion centers, as well as organizations involved in enforcing law and 
conducting intelligence activities. The reporting includes documents produced by federal, 
state, and local governmental organizations and collaborative initiatives representing 
efforts to provide strategic guidance to aid in the development and operation of a fusion 
center.  
The next category of literature consists of works by a variety of governmental and 
private organizations some of which provide oversight and governance over the Network. 
These works consist of reports, assessments, official and unofficial critiques of the 
function, process, and areas needing improvement concerning fusion center operations.  
The third category of literature was produced by industry and academia and 
focuses on marketing and branding principles. While this grouping of documentation 
concentrates on strategic communications employed by business and government 
programs and products, none of the content directly spotlights techniques used by the 
Network.  
The last grouping of literature reviewed consists of items from authors and 
organizations representing a variety of backgrounds and disciplines. Some of the 
documents represent official governmental reports, others consist of findings from 
academic research, and others may represent findings from non-governmental 
organizations.  
 15
5. Steps of Analysis 
This research employed a modified version of the multi-goal policy analysis 
method as a guide for the conduct of analysis.43 
 Collection of data: Documents, reports, policy, and guidance that focus 
on Network-level activities were sought and applied to individual fusion 
center data when applicable to demonstrate examples of items that can be 
extrapolated across the Network.  
 Selection of problem set criteria: Collected data depicting positive and 
negative aspects of Network operations were divided into categories of 
strengths and weaknesses. These items were further analyzed to identify 
which positive and negative attributes were repeatedly presented or 
appeared to have been reported over time. These elements were then 
categorized into the following groups: administration, analysis, 
information sharing, mission, and privacy. 
 Analyze criticisms to determine root-cause: Negative attributes were 
next analyzed to determine origin of complaints. 
 Evaluate and compare data to identify gaps: Information placed in the 
criticizing groups was then cross-referenced to determine if any of the 
elements had any mitigation efforts applied to them by the Network. Items 
identified which had little or no mitigation efforts applied to them were 
then identified as gap areas. 
 Evaluate gaps to determine potential mitigation strategies: These 
identified gaps were analyzed in order to determine if existing strategies 
elsewhere could provide potential solutions to neutralize these gaps.  
 Predict challenges of implementation of strategies: Where corrective 
actions were determined as potential solutions, analysis to identify 
challenges and further research to highlight best practices was listed. 
 Identify potential areas to reinforce success: Items not identified as 
gaps, but which offered points that articulate positive Network attributes 
were highlighted. 
                                                 
43. Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012); Carl V. Patton and David S. Sawicki, Basic 
Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1993), 52–65; 
David L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle 
River, NJ, Prentice Hall, 2005). 
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6. Intended Output 
Examination of the factors which have contributed to the uneven support for the 
Network will result in a better understanding of the policy and operational concerns faced 
by the organization. This research highlights the relationship between the Network’s 
operations and the perception of its performance. Results of this study point to current 
and future challenges confronting the Network and offer recommendations of action 
which may increase program efficiency and facilitate organizational support. These 
recommendations are intended to help the Network pinpoint areas of future priorities 
which if implemented will address current criticisms, possibly reverse negative 
perceptions, and allow the organization to avoid repetition of previous missteps.  
E. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
SLTT fusion centers have existed for over ten years at the time of this publication. 
During this time frame the Network has experienced significant changes and 
development challenges. Since the early 2000s the nation has gone from a zero tolerance 
(for terrorism) stance to a place where the Boston Bombing barely lasted a month in the 
public’s consciousness. Intelligence and public safety services went from a time when 
budgets were growing exponentially to the post-recession era of austerity. 
As this pendulum moved from one side to the other, perceptions and attitudes 
about the relevancy of the Network began to change as well. While changing opinions is 
a normal occurrence in government and life in general, some criticisms about the 
Network’s operations appear to have been brought up in reporting and testimony through 
the years due to recycled or circular reporting. In areas where mitigation has been 
employed or where gaps have been filled by training or initiative development there is 
some evidence that these may not be factored into the current performance of the 
Network. All of these factors have contributed to a diverse set of opinions about the 
performance and relevancy of the Network writ large. 
Examination of these criticisms compared to mitigation plans is necessary to 
provide a current and more accurate view of the status of the Network. Due largely to the 
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current budget crisis, over the next few years many programs and initiatives will most 
likely not survive the significant downward change in funding. Study into the elements 
that have contributed into this uneven assessment of the Network would help determine 
the current status of the Network. This research will also identify future challenges that 
fusion centers will have to overcome in order to survive. This study will contribute to the 
growing body of reporting on fusion centers and is necessary to aid in assessing if 
perceptions about the Network need to be recalibrated. 
F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter I lays out the foundations for this study. This section highlights the 
problem set and provides a background on the establishment and operations of the 
Network. This chapter also attempts to provide an overview of this study’s research 
parameters as well as identify the significance of this research.  
The next chapter provides an overview of the body of literature works reviewed 
during the research process. This section also categorizes and assesses the potential value 
of the literature. 
Chapter III examines the administration and governance structure for entities in 
the Network. Administration concerns items involved with fusion center governance, 
oversight, authorities, discipline culture, and overall management factors. Common 
concerns about fusion center administration will be identified and listed. This section will 
conclude with items that were discovered in research that either supports or refutes the 
original areas of concern. 
Chapter IV reviews the elements that consist of intelligence analysis activities. 
Analysis largely focuses on a fusion center’s capacity to conduct thoughtful and 
meaningful intelligence analysis that supports stakeholder requirements. Like in chapter 
three, weaknesses that have been voiced by third party entities will be captured and listed.  
Information sharing activities will be examined in Chapter V. The section on 
information sharing focuses on the ability to inform and connect partner agencies with 
information to guide operations and decision making. A review of the Network criticisms 
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in this realm will be examined against fusion center successes to help determine the 
current status of the Network. 
In Chapter VI the Network and individual fusion center mission will be the focus 
of review. Mission refers to the organizational focus of the entity, prioritization of 
competing requirements, as well as the organization’s self-view of its responsibilities. 
This chapter will attempt to determine if broader missions or specified missions are 
beneficial to the Network’s ability to execute its responsibilities. 
Chapter VII will address privacy, civil rights, and civil liberty (P/CRCL) issues 
surrounding the Network. Privacy covers the Network’s transparency and ability to 
execute protections for citizen privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Examples of 
successes and failures of P/CRCL protections will be examined to better assess the 
Network’s capability. 
The final two chapters will present the findings of the research. Strategic 
recommendations are highlighted in chapter eight which address the mitigation factors 
and analysis which are presented in chapters three through seven. Future challenges and 
areas for that would benefit from further inquiry will be documented as well. Final 
conclusions and summaries of findings will also be highlighted in the final chapter. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the existing literature and research concerning fusion centers has focused 
on the background, guidance, and recommendations for the improvement of the Network. 
The body of literature is represented by works from official government inquiries, non-
profit organization assessments, media reviews, scholarly research, as well as 
independent analysis. The body of reporting appears to lack any specific research into 
how perception of the structure has been positively or negatively affected if one was to 
apply marketing and branding techniques. Literature concerning marketing practices and 
campaigns executed by private and public industry was reviewed in an attempt to identify 
principles which could be applied in support of the Network. 
For the purposes of organization, the literature is divided into four categories; 
framework/guidelines, review/assessments/critiques, supplementary-marketing/branding 
and supplementary-Network. 
A. LITERATURE: FRAMEWORK/GUIDELINES 
The first category of literature focuses on guidelines, governing documents and 
policy relating to fusion centers, as well as organizations involved in enforcing law and 
conducting intelligence activities. The reporting includes documents produced by federal, 
state and local governmental organizations and collaborative initiatives representing 
efforts to provide strategic guidance to aid in the development and operation of a fusion 
center. This grouping of literature ensures there is a sound strategic template for the 
creation, operation, governance structure and road map for maturation for fusion centers. 
The primary authors of many of these source documents are the Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiative (Global), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Global is a federal advisory committee 
consisting of representatives from various state and local law enforcement organizations 
which supports and advises the U.S. Attorney General on information sharing related 
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initiatives.44 Each of these entities has a vested interest in the successful development and 
operation of the Network. DHS and DOJ both have statutory mandates to facilitate 
information sharing between all levels of government.  
Global serves as an advisory committee to DOJ; this organization claims 
credibility due to its composition consisting of state and local membership from various 
disciplines. The Network is viewed by many federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial 
organizations as one mechanism which can help address the critical requirement of the 
sharing of threat information. These documents center on the establishment of 
organizational framework and recommendations from subject matter experts generally 
involved in the operation of the Network or from organizations positioned as stakeholders 
of the Network. While value propositions are detailed in some of the literature in this 
category, no products in this category attempt to either assess the effectiveness or purport 
successes or failures of fusion centers. The proposals in this documentation appear to be 
based on perceived customer need and subject experience, as well as legal requirements, 
and less on performance analysis.  
One of the two founding documents for the Network co-authored by Global, 
DHS, and DOJ is titled “Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information 
and Intelligence in a New Era.45“ This document identifies a set of operating guidelines 
to assist in the development of fusion centers in a consistent manner which would aid in 
coordination efforts and collaboration and capabilities for the Network. These guidelines 
highlight the need for the creation of policies, procedures, goals, structure, training, and 
partner agreements, as well as identify these components as key elements to 
organizational success.46  
In 2008 Global, DHS, and DOJ produced another key document titled Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Fusion Centers: A Supplement to the Fusion 
                                                 
44. “Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global),” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Justice Programs, accessed October 25, 2013, https://it.ojp.gov/
default.aspx?area=globalJustice&page=1019. 
45. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and 
Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines. 
46. Ibid.  
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Center Guidelines in order to identify the minimum elements required to successfully 
execute the roles and responsibilities of a fusion center.47 This supplement lays out the 
necessary capabilities and identifies the standards required for their achievement. The 
document attempts to formulate a blueprint which would enhance consistency across the 
Network.48 These minimum standards were subsequently applied to formulate critical 
operating and enabling capabilities used as assessment criteria to assess individual fusion 
center and Network progress.49  
Both of the above-mentioned documents represent necessary components 
identified by federal, state and local agencies involved with the fusion center process. 
While the capabilities and criteria highlighted are recommendations and not mandates, 
they are currently viewed by the Network and supporting agencies as the essential 
requirements that all fusion centers should build to. Because of the shared recognition 
from stakeholders that the guidelines and capabilities represent the requisite skill sets, 
business processes, and policies each unit of the Network must obtain, these are generally 
viewed as fundamental documents for fusion centers. 
Other literature in the category also produced by Global, DHS, and DOJ, largely 
focuses on specific process development concerning subcomponents of the Guidelines 
and Baseline Capability documents. Many of these items discuss the integration of 
additional resources and disciplines into operations. Developing an analytic capability to 
enhance critical infrastructure and key resource security is defined as relevant to fusion 
center responsibilities.50 Guidance for incorporating the Fire Service discipline is 
                                                 
47. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, Baseline Capabilities. 
48. Ibid. 
49. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers: Final Report 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/2012%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers%20Final%20Report.pdf; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers: Final Report (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2014), http://www.sheriffs.org/sites/default/files/uploads/
2013%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers%20Final%20Report.pdf. 
50. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR): Protection Capabilities 
for Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2008), https://it.ojp.gov/gist/92/Critical-
Infrastructure-and-Key-Resources--Protection-Capabilities-for-Fusion-Centers. 
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identified as an enhancement to operations.51 Documentation defining business processes 
for fusion center technology attempts to help these centers develop a business 
architecture which would help in identifying organizational needs.52 Additional literature 
focuses on guidance for integration of technology into the business capabilities of a 
fusion center.53 This body of literature provides additional detailed recommendations and 
considerations which, where applied, enhance fusion center operations, and provides 
supplemental data and templates to aid in the execution of these processes. 
Establishment of sound procedures and policies for the protections of civil 
liberties, civil rights, and privacy have been expressed as a need by both public and 
governmental organizations alike. These principles have been viewed as especially 
critical for any organization involved in information sharing, data storing, law 
enforcement operations, and intelligence activities. Global, DHS and DOJ have issued 
documents concerning this critical component of operations. The Fusion Center Privacy 
Policy Development guide addresses the first step of this process by providing content 
that aids fusion centers in the development of a privacy policy.54 This document 
highlights the components of a complete policy that covers items such as data 
minimization, merging of records, oversight, appeals processes, and information security 
as well as other topics relevant for consideration in this realm.55 A supplement produced 
by the same authors aids members of the Network in confirming their compliance and 
                                                 
51. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2010), https://it.ojp.gov/gist/93/Fire-Service-Integration-for-Fusion-Centers. 
52. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Defining Fusion Center Technology Business Processes: A Tool for Planning 
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Technology-Business-Process--A-Tool-for-Planning. 
53. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Fusion Center Technology Resources Road Map: Elements of an Enterprise 
Architecture for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
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verification of policies and procedures for the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties.56 
Literature discussing the process of developing an analytic capability in an 
organization is also very relevant to the Network. Global and DOJ have provided 
guidance identifying minimum training standards for organizations involved in criminal 
justice.57 This document attempts to frame the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for 
an organization to establish and grow a cadre of personnel involved in intelligence 
activities from analyst level through executive level.58 In Common Competencies for 
State, Local, and Tribal Intelligence Analysts the authors attempt to build upon the 
previous document and link analyst competencies with fusion center operations.59 This 
document is significant to fusion centers due to its attempts to define analytical standards 
across the Network.60 Another document produced by Global in conjunction with the 
International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts in response to the 
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan provided recommendations to codify an 
analyst’s role in organizations involved in law enforcement and intelligence operations.61 
These documents provide a foundational framework identified by subject matter experts 
represented from various organizations with analysis responsibilities. 
                                                 
56. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Compliance Verification for the 
Intelligence Enterprise (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). it.ojp.gov/
docdownloader.aspx?ddid=1285. 
57. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for Law Enforcement and 
Other Criminal Justice Agencies in the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2007), 
it.ojp.gov/docdownloader.aspx?ddid=1152.  
58. Ibid. 
59. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Common Competencies for State, Local, and Tribal Intelligence Analysts 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2010), it.ojp.gov/docdownloader.aspx?ddid=1296.  
60. Ibid. 
61. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2003), https://it.ojp.gov/documents/
National_Criminal_Intelligence_Sharing_Plan.pdf; Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the 
International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc., Law Enforcement Analytic 
Standards, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2012), https://it.ojp.gov/
docdownloader.aspx?ddid=1151. 
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This first category of literature establishes the organizational expectations, roles, 
and responsibilities, and underscores areas fusion centers should consider as part of their 
expansion plans when developing strategic projections. This category provides guidance 
intended to enhance operational capabilities of a fusion center. These documents 
represent the collective guidance from subject matter experts at different levels of the 
government involved in all aspects of the fusion center mission.  
B. LITERATURE: REVIEW/ASSESSMENTS/CRITIQUES 
The next category of literature was produced by a variety of governmental and 
private organizations some of which provide oversight and governance over the Network. 
These works consist of reports, assessments, official, and unofficial critiques of fusion 
center functions. They also analyze fusion center processes and identify areas needing. 
Some of the individual reporting in this category is based on interviews of small samples 
of fusion centers making it difficult to provide a generalization of the Network from one 
or a limited number of documents. Across the body of reporting many of the major 
findings and areas of concern are similar, and come from originating agencies such as the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), with a history of reporting in a fair and balanced manner increasing the validity 
of findings.  
Multiple documents from the same agencies and new organizations add to and 
update previous reports listing new concerns, as well as those already existing. Many of 
the updates cite where improvements have been made, but at times these improvements 
appear to be undervalued in the literature. Some of the documents in this category used 
references of source materials from components in this and the first category of literature 
coupled with original data. Report findings in this category could be subject to circular 
reporting and in some cases agency biases, but broader topical findings at times are 
similar and supportive of other agency findings which increases the confidence in many 
of the defined high level concerns. 
The CRS has produced a litany of reports focusing on fusion centers. Some 
address federal support to, others outlining issues and concerns of, and others defining 
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the Network tie into federal initiatives. A report issued in 2007 and an updated report in 
2008 provides the value proposition of the Network and lists potential risks to the 
centers.62 The authors provide an overview of the Network identifying organizational 
concerns as well as potential recommendations to Congress on a path forward. The 
documents highlight the value proposition of the network and identify ideals that it 
attempts to achieve as well as operating philosophies, current direction, management 
issues, and external misuse concerns.63 
A 2011 report describing the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative 
(NSI) and general sharing of terrorism information provides an overview of operations 
and explains how fusion centers are at the core of collection and integration of domestic 
intelligence reporting concerning suspicious activities.64 Some of the concerns raised in 
the report focus on privacy and data access, as well as the potential for a system stressed 
by an influx of too much information.65 While focusing on the President’s Countering 
Violent Extremism (CVE) initiative which attempts to counter radicalization in the 
United States, another report notes fusion centers’ role in aiding in this effort.66 This 
document highlights the strategic goals and implementation plans as well as defines the 
program’s three main objectives: to enhance federal engagement in this topic, to increase 
governmental expertise in this arena, and to counter extremist propaganda. In the view of 
this report, fusion centers are seen as integral participants in the initiative best poised for 
community engagement.67  
The GAO has also reviewed and reported on operations of the Network. In her 
September 2007 testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
                                                 
62. Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options; Todd Masse and John Rollins, A 
Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress (CRS Report No. RL34177) 
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Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress (CRS Report No. RL34070) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2008),  http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Bjelopera, Terrorism Information Sharing. 
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Intelligence, the Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, and the Committee 
on Homeland Security, Eileen Larence cited various challenges facing the Network.68 
This testimony and subsequent reporting later that year from GAO provided an overview 
of DHS and DOJ efforts to support fusion centers citing items such as access to 
information systems, issuance of security clearances for center personnel, deployment of 
personnel, technical assistance services, and funding. These reports recognize fusion 
centers as an important part of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and 
communicate concerns expressed by a sampling of centers such as sustainment funding 
and the lack of a long-term federal strategy to support the network.69  
A 2008 update to previous reporting by GAO revisited some of its earlier 
findings, but lists the improvement of federal government efforts to support the 
Network.70 It cites the development of baseline capabilities for fusion centers as useful 
for the network, but refrains from making an early assessment of the extent of the 
impact.71 A 2010 assessment on the Network from the same organization found that 
many items on the same topic were lacking.72 While grant guidance had since been 
amended to address fusion centers sustainment, funding was still a concern. They noted 
homeland security grant funding did not have a specified requirement that directly 
supported individual centers which caused this funding to be uneven across the Network. 
Findings from their research also cited that the DHS had not identified specific 
performance measures to evaluate the Network.73  
                                                 
68. Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to Address Challenges Faced by 
State and Local Information Fusion Centers, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
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73. Ibid.  
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A 2010 report studying the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ (I&A) 
mission to support state and local organizations underscored the importance of initiatives 
such as the development and cataloguing of stakeholder information needs which were at 
that time underway.74 The document cites fusion centers as a necessary conduit for DHS 
to execute its information sharing mission. Recommendations from the investigation 
stated milestones and timelines. The report also stated the view that continued use of and 
encouragement of feedback from state and local partners was needed to aid in 
prioritization of customer needs. The document also recommended the establishment of a 
timeline for the creation of additional performance measures.75 
In its 2011 report on interaction between state Emergency Operation Centers 
(EOC) and fusion centers, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) recognized the 
critical roles that fusion centers and EOCs have in coordinating operations and sharing 
information throughout their state and local jurisdictions.76 The document specifically 
addresses interactions between fusion centers and EOC finding that in many cases, there 
is limited knowledge from each element of the others responsibilities or capabilities. 
Recommendations from this investigation identified items to increase collaboration 
among the two types of centers.77 
In 2012 and 2013, the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives released 
separate reports assessing operations, capabilities, and identifying concerns of 
organizations involved with direct and indirect support to the Network.78 The report titled 
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Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers communicated 
claims such as DHS missteps which have yielded in low quality intelligence to support 
counterterrorism efforts. Also noted are examples of fusion center products that highlight 
civil liberty and privacy concerns as well as the assessment that DHS has overinflated the 
value and success of fusion centers. The report also cites examples that led to the findings 
that DHS mismanagement of homeland security grant funding has led to misuse.79  
The report from the U.S. House of Representatives highlights the results of a 
nineteen-month study of the Network.80 The committee assessed that the Network 
enhances the capabilities of the federal government’s counterterrorism efforts and 
mentioned that fusion centers allow the government to leverage unique expertise 
potentially unavailable otherwise. The authors of the House report also identify that the 
establishment of critical operating capabilities has increased fusion center consistency 
and recommends continued federal government support to aid in the further maturation of 
the Network. This document recognized some of the previous and continuing challenges 
that the Network has experienced, but cited improvements that have led to increased 
capabilities of these organizations. One challenge to fusion centers mentioned as an item 
in the report that needs to be addressed is the creation of a comprehensive national 
strategy, which includes considerations for the operations of the Network. The report also 
mentioned that diminished funding was a risk to the further development of the Network 
and expressed concern that dwindling budgets could cause components of the Network to 
close leaving the country at a greater risk. Increased efforts to bolster processes, such as 
liaison officer programs to facilitate information flow to non-law enforcement first 
responders and critical infrastructure partners, was claimed to be a positive capability of 
the Network and one that should be targeted for continued improvement.81  
In conjunction with allied partners, DHS published the aggregated findings of its 
2011, 2012, and 2013 assessments of the Network, which consisted of an evaluation of 
all fusion centers that comprised the Network in those reporting periods (72, 77, and 78 
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respectively).82 The assessments looked at the Network’s progress on obtaining the 
critical operating capabilities and enabling capabilities. The first document attempted to 
establish the initial baseline of capabilities assessed in a manner that was intended to 
provide a repeatable report where subsequent findings could identify positive or negative 
directions of the Network.83 The 2012 report was the first of subsequent reports which 
was able to compare the Network’s performance to the previous year’s assessment.84 All 
three reports revealed many year-over-year improvements from the original 2011 
assessment, showing a 14 percent network average score increase, which demonstrated 
the continued maturation of the Network.85 Of particular interest to this research is the 
review of fusion centers communications and outreach. The authors note an overall 
increase in the Network’s score in this category and clearly state the importance of the 
establishment and execution of a strategic communication plan, but this part of the 
assessment appears to have focused on the presence of a plan and not on the substance or 
specific implementation tactics of the plan.86 
Viewed individually, documents from this second category provide individual 
assessments of the Network. Analyzing the entire group of reports, on the other hand, 
provides great insight to help identify strengths of, and challenges to, the Network from 
multiple angles of exposure. Virtually every piece of literature in this grouping 
acknowledges the unique and significant role fusion centers play in the information 
sharing environment. While a few of the reports appear to have overly negative or 
positive biases about fusion center performance, many of the reviews communicate 
similar concerns and gaps experienced by fusion centers. These similarities could 
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represent areas where targeted performance measures and external communications from 
the Network should focus. 
C. LITERATURE: SUPPLEMENTAL-MARKETING/BRANDING 
This category of literature consists of documents produced by industry and 
academia that explore marketing and branding principles. None of the content discovered 
directly addresses research or studies conducted specifically on strategic communications 
or marketing as it pertains to fusion centers. There is a vast body of literature consisting 
of topics on marketing and branding available. Attempts were made to review a variety of 
pieces in this discipline that cover strategies when bringing traditional industry products 
and government programs to market. Research in this category attempted to identify 
common components of successful marketing plans as discovered by academic research, 
viewed from expert opinion, or identified by industry. Identification of marketing 
successes that contain elements which can be applied to the Network was sought in this 
grouping. 
Antonopoulos discusses that like traditional business, governments need to market 
and brand their services in order to ensure success.87 He explains that immerging 
technologies, such as social media websites and the like, have caused the consumer 
(general public in the case of government) to become more savvy and selective compared 
to past consumers. These technologies need to be engaged in order to execute a 
successful marketing campaign. Marketing strategies also need to incorporate senior 
leaders from the onset in order to benefit from them as champions for the product/service. 
Antonopoulos’s article explains that good brands must be simple and communicate a 
clear picture of the product or service. They must also be meaningful and allow 
employees to communicate the reason they do what they do, motivate people, create trust, 
create unity in the organization, lead behavioral change, and be relevant to the 
organization and to the consumer, as well as develop a unified brand identity across all 
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areas of communication. He explains that marketing strategies need to have clear 
objectives, performance indicators and effectiveness measurements.88 
In an interview by Eileen Courter, Maurice Smith, President and CEO of the 
Local Government Federal Credit Union in Raleigh, North Carolina, explains his 
background and reasons for the success of his organization.89 Smith attributes the 
positive outcomes to organizational branding and marketing. He explains that 
relationship building starting with his advisory council has contributed to consumer 
understanding of the organization and enhanced customer loyalty. Emphasis on two-way 
communication was cited as aiding in the process.90 
Research into the marketing of education for the United Kingdom University in 
the article “Emotional Connections in Higher Education Marking” identifies the need for 
universities to develop relationships with would-be students at an earlier age.91 The 
article examines the University of Ulster branding and marketing strategies, which are 
intended on making an emotional connection with potential students. The campaign was 
centered on an androgynous character at a decision point in his/her life where 
opportunities were most abundant at the University of Ulster. The campaign put to use 
television, radio, billboards, as well as Internet advertisements as its dissemination 
platforms. The study found that the character was able to form an emotional connection 
with potential customers who related to his plight. The University saw a marked increase 
in brand recall that resulted in increased product interest.92 
A study based on surveys of 274 public managers involved in place marketing 
based out of the Netherlands discussed that perceived obstacles to the implementation of 
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a marketing plan did not necessarily determine the effectiveness of a campaign.93 The 
study aimed to identify obstacles in place marketing and relationships between the 
obstacles and the results of the campaigns. The surveys indicated that public managers 
felt administrative and political obstacles were the most influential determinant of 
success or failure of a marketing campaign. Analysis indicated that while those items 
were important, the substance/content of the marketing campaign had the most significant 
influence on attracting the target audience to the product.94 
Hood and Henderson describe the evolution of the United Kingdom Public 
Library Service and its attempt to market itself to increase awareness of services and 
product use.95 The article highlights the decline in popularity that stems from competition 
from commercial book sellers, libraries not being viewed as the public center anymore, 
and perception that the Internet provides individuals with broader access to information. 
Budget reduction is also cited as a culprit for a decline in library usage and has led to 
them being viewed as a service in decline. The article provides insight into the 
advantages and drawbacks of the development of a national marketing strategy and 
highlights factors motivating stakeholder development of a brand as well as thoughts 
about how a brand would benefit the organization.96  
In “Governance in Innovative Cities and the Importance of Branding,” Hospers 
explains how Austin, Texas, Oresund, Sweden, and Manchester, United Kingdom, 
targeted policy measures in the field of innovation with a particular focus on branding.97 
Discussion on the importance of image is cited as being a determining factor of recruiting 
individuals into a city. Examples are provided of cities with similar and/or generic 
monikers branding themselves in a manner that does not differentiate themselves from 
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other cities thereby defeating the purpose of the brand. Oresund was described as having 
successfully branded the region through the networked use of its logo to partner 
organizations where each city was able to employ the region’s brand for their own 
marketing initiatives.98 
Another study, described in an article in International Journal of Organizational 
Innovation, used customer surveys from Taiwan-based retail stores in an attempt to 
determine how branding, marketing strategy and product/service quality affect customer 
loyalty.99 The author found that corporations can influence customer loyalty by focusing 
on brand equity and marketing mix, while customer service seemed to influence product 
recommendation.100  
Catherine Needham reviewed the Clinton and Blair administration’s efforts to 
strategically communicate their goals and objectives in order to gain and maintain public 
support.101 She identified positive and negative aspects of their marketing campaigns in 
the U.S. and UK respectively. Needham identified six attributes of successful brands  as 
simplicity, uniqueness, reassurance, aspiration, values, and credibility. Her article 
discusses how defensive marketing techniques were administered to ensure customer 
satisfaction and consolidate support. It also discussed how the administrations worked at 
different points to reassure their support base that they made the right decision. Post-
purchase reassurance was viewed as important when there was little brand differentiation 
or the lack of the ability to judge between competing brands. She found that the strategic 
imperative for a government is to build enduring relationships with its winning coalition 
of voters, ensuring that the bundle of impressions that led voters to elect it was reinforced 
from within office. Needham explained how effective brands consider internal values, 
external presentation, and consumer perception in order to increase customer loyalty. If a 
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marketing campaign is executed properly, it will simplify the message, differentiate it 
from competitors, minimize perception of consumer risk, evoke a particular vision of the 
good life or personal enhancement, symbolize the internal values of the company, and 
ensure brands are perceived as credible, delivering on its promise.102  
In their article, Smith and Speed discussed how cultural branding elements, 
specifically consumer culture theory (CCT) can provide political stability if applied in 
UK political marketing.103 They explain how CCT focuses on sociology and 
anthropology as sources of marketing. The article identifies traits and roles of branding in 
politics and how cultural branding may help identify gaps between brand identity and 
brand image.104  
Szondi addressed the importance of public relations (PR) in nation branding; he 
pointed out that relationship building may overtake image management as the new 
marketing paradigm.105 His article identified common misuse and overgeneralization of 
branding concepts. He claimed PR is described as heavily investing in relationships 
between the patron and client that can potentially develop into communal relationships 
that are valued as having a high level of trust, thereby increasing the strength of a brand. 
These relationships were viewed as strongest, provided the message was consistent, two-
way, anticipated important issues, viewed as trustworthy, and enabled an organization to 
serve a community.106 
Another document reviewed brand symbols and slogans of 97 government 
websites and recommended best practices as well as highlighted challenges.107 Some of 
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the challenges mentioned concerned the infrequent use of brand elements and suggested 
the integration of marketing communications. The author also explained the difficulty of 
controlling the strategic messaging of organizations with multiple and varied ownership. 
The article further discussed how to communicate brand knowledge through repetitive 
messaging and made claims that it aids with brand recall and recognition. The author 
discussed additional challenges of government branding, such as customer confusion due 
to multiple organizations marketing and branding similar entities. An example provided 
was a local government attempting to brand a city while the chamber of commerce may 
have a similar, but different market strategy.108  
This third category of literature highlighted many reviews, studies, and opinions 
of elements that contribute to or detract from a successful marketing strategy. Viewed 
together, they allow the reviewer to extract common elements that need to be considered 
in the development of a marketing campaign for a product, initiative, idea, and even a 
location. This category lacks specific research on strategic communications concerning 
the Network. This section also does not directly address recommendations or ideas for 
executing such a plan.  
D. LITERATURE: SUPPLEMENTAL-NETWORK 
The last grouping of literature reviewed consists of items from authors and 
organizations from a variety of backgrounds. Some of the documents represent official 
governmental reports, others consist of findings from academic research, and others may 
represent findings from organizations with obvious biases on the topic of fusion centers. 
That said, each of these documents provides relevant points of view or introduces topics 
and arguments germane to the Network. Some of the findings from organizations with an 
obvious prejudice against the mission of the Network are still relevant since aspects of 
their findings have, at times, been similar to other findings from separate organizations, 
which increase the validity of that specific finding. 
In its 2013 review of information sharing, the GAO conducted an assessment 
focusing largely on the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI) and 
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evaluating the current status of the program.109 This review provides overall 
recommendations to bridge some of the gaps identified in the assessment. While this 
document focuses on the federal aspect of this program, it highlights that central 
stakeholders are state and local partners. In addition, it specifically mentions fusion 
center involvement as key to the program’s success. Sections of the report address DHS’s 
evaluation of suspicious activity reporting provided by state and local partners from 2007 
to 2011.110 Review of the reporting resulted in 69 percent being rated as having analytic 
value.111 
In his March 2013 testimony to the U.S House of Representatives, Ross Ashley 
explained the importance of the Network and highlighted the value proposition of the 
organization.112 He cited various success stories illustrating the Network’s role in 
gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information to entities across the nation. He 
stressed that the Network had a positive impact not only on the nation’s counterterrorism 
efforts, but with traditional law enforcement activities as well. Funding increases were 
mentioned as necessary to sustain and grow the Network.113  
In their published report, Zones of Opacity, Monahan and Regan conducted 
interviews and research into state surveillance and focused on the Network.114 They 
provide the background of fusion centers, highlighting their integral role in intelligence 
operations. In their article, they introduce fusion centers as “centres of concatenation” 
and describe their operations as nodes in the information pipeline that often plays an 
important role in data fusion, but they tend not to be the start or endpoint of operations. 
Some of the concerns communicated by the authors dealt with privacy as numerous other 
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primary sources have indicated. Monahan and Regan also found that while many of the 
fusion center staff (representing three dozen centers) reported having an oversight or 
advisory board, these governing structures may be focusing more on the future direction 
or strategic plans of the individual centers and less on adherence to policy. They conclude 
that fusion centers may be in need of more structured governance and express concern 
that this may be a difficult task.115 
In their 2007 report, titled What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers, German and 
Stanley discuss the Network’s role in law enforcement and intelligence activities.116 
They lend a critical view toward the Network and cite cases where some fusion centers 
engaged in what they define as improper activities. A majority of the items mentioned 
focused on civil liberties and privacy rights of citizens. Stanley and German make various 
assertions against the Network and draw parallels between the centers and “Anti-
Subversive Squads, Red Squads,” and a highly disputed FBI Counter Intelligence 
Program (COINTELPRO). The authors make claims concerning the unlawfulness of 
fusion center collaboration with non-law enforcement partners such as the military, 
private sector, and others. They also state that there are virtually no guidelines, legal 
framework, or oversight mechanisms governing the fusion centers. Stanley and German 
also make accusations that unspecified centers are willingly attempting to break privacy 
laws and that fusion centers in general are not effective at executing their mission 
requirements.117  
In “Fusion Center Privacy Policies: Does One Size Fit All?” Jennifer Harper 
examines the balance between fusion center information sharing intended to enhance 
national security and privacy and civil liberty concerns.118 She explores many of the 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberty concerns expressed by governmental and private 
organizations regarding fusion centers. Harper’s research covered the roles and 
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responsibilities of fusion centers, relevant federal regulations concerning privacy, 
guidelines set forth to the Network by DOJ and DHS, as well as documents from privacy 
advocacy organizations. Her paper concludes with the recommendation of a privacy 
framework for a specific fusion center in the northeastern part of the United States.119 
In his research involving four fusion centers in the northeastern part of the United 
States, Walter Smith attempted to study successes, failures, and general processes in 
order to identify traits for the development of an ideal fusion center.120 His research 
involved dissecting DHS and DOJ guidelines in order to determine how each of the 
fusion centers implemented these recommendations. Smith highlights the fusion center 
and DHS value propositions, fusion center success stories, fusion center capabilities, and 
reviewed operations of the four centers mentioned above. He also reviewed existing 
reporting and documentation that attempted to highlight and critique fusion center 
capabilities and functions. Smith’s findings identified that a federated strategy for fusion 
centers was key to the Network’s success and assessed that the fusion centers he 
reviewed were moving in a positive direction ultimately unifying the Network.121  
This last category of documents consists of research, opinions, and studies of 
different aspects of the Network. Some of the opinions and findings expressed in the 
documents mirror some of those defined in literature in the other categories. Many of the 
reports in this body of work provide unique perspectives and viewpoints focusing on 
direction, effectiveness, and challenges of fusion center operations. This category 
enhances the understanding of the Network and balances reporting from other primary 
and secondary sources. 
E. LITERATURE: CONCLUSION 
Literature in the area concerning guidelines for the management, structure, and 
mission responsibilities of fusion centers is vast. These documents provide a good 
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template for the development and operation of a fusion center and are viewed as credible 
documents created by leveraging subject matter experts in a variety of disciplines.  
Other reporting highlights the successes and challenges of the Network and 
provides a unique picture at the direction and maturation of the organization overtime. 
While some of the critiques or assessment methodology may be subject to biases due to 
many variables, many of the major findings and concerns across this body of reporting 
have similar threads, which increase the confidence in the summary of this category’s 
findings. There is a significant amount of published research concerning marketing 
principals from primary and secondary sources. This category is void of study 
specifically dealing with fusion centers or marketing research conducted on a parallel 










This chapter concerns items dealing with the administration of individual fusion 
centers and the Network writ large. Administration of fusion centers involves network 
oversight structures, governing bodies with responsibilities over the fusion centers, legal 
authorities in which different parts of the Network are required to operate, disciplines of 
those participating within fusion centers, as well as overall management and 
organizational structures. Components of administration have come into question since 
the establishment of fusion centers.  
DHS organizes these fusion centers into two categories: primary fusion centers 
and recognized fusion centers. Those achieving the primary designation have been 
identified by the state or territory’s senior executive as their lead fusion center for the 
integration of intelligence information.122 This designation signifies the organizational 
alignment of a given state or territory and does not necessarily define authority or 
governing hierarchy. Simply put, at network level, each center is treated as its own entity 
and each center has the same weight of representation in the Network. Because of this 
decentralized structure, each of the 78 fusion centers that make up the Network are 
owned and operated by their own executive agencies and departments.123  
Primary Fusion Centers 
 Alabama Fusion Center 
 Alaska Information and Analysis Center 
 Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 
 Arkansas State Fusion Center 
 California State Threat Assessment Center 
 Colorado Information Analysis Center 
 Connecticut Intelligence Center 
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 Delaware Information and Analysis Center 
 Florida Fusion Center 
 Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
 Hawaii Fusion Center 
 Idaho Criminal Intelligence Center 
 Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center 
 Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center 
 Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center 
 Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center 
 Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center 
 Louisiana State Analytical & Fusion Exchange 
 Maine Information and Analysis Center 
 Mariana Regional Fusion Center (Guam) 
 Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center 
 Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center 
 Michigan Intelligence Operations Center 
 Minnesota Fusion Center 
 Mississippi Analysis and Information Center 
 Missouri Information Analysis Center 
 Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center 
 Nebraska Information Analysis Center 
 New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center 
 New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center 
 New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center 
 New York State Intelligence Center 
 North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
 North Dakota State and Local Intelligence Center 
 Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center 
 Oklahoma Information Fusion Center 
 Oregon Terrorism Information Threat Assessment Network 
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 Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center 
 Puerto Rico National Security State Information Center 
 Rhode Island State Fusion Center 
 South Carolina Information and Intelligence Center 
 South Dakota Fusion Center 
 Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center (Las Vegas, Nevada) 
 Tennessee Fusion Center 
 Texas Joint Crime Information Center 
 U.S. Virgin Islands Fusion Center 
 Utah Statewide Information and Analysis Center 
 Vermont Intelligence Center 
 Virginia Fusion Center 
 Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center (Washington, D.C.) 
 Washington State Fusion Center 
 West Virginia Intelligence Fusion Center 
 Wisconsin Statewide Information Center124 
 
Recognized Fusion Centers 
 Austin Regional Intelligence Center; Austin, Texas 
 Boston Regional Intelligence Center; Boston, Massachusettes 
 Central California Intelligence Center; Sacramento, California 
 Central Florida Intelligence Exchange; Orlando, Florida 
 Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center; Chicago, Illinois 
 Cincinnati/Hamilton County Regional Terrorism Early Warning Group; 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
 Dallas Fusion Center; Dallas, Texas 
 Delaware Valley Intelligence Center; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
 Detroit and Southeast Michigan Information and Intelligence Center; 
Detroit, Michigan 
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 El Paso Multi-Agency Tactical Response Information eXchange 
(MATRIX); El Paso, Texas 
 Houston Regional Intelligence Service Center; Houston, Texas 
 Kansas City Terrorism Early Warning Fusion Center; Kansas City, 
Missouri 
 Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center; Los Angeles, California 
 Nevada Threat Analysis Center; Carson City, Nevada 
 North Central Texas Fusion Center; McKinney, Texas 
 Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center; Cleveland, Ohio 
 Northern California Regional Intelligence Center; San Francisco, 
California 
 Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center; Fairfax, Virginia 
 Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center; Orange County, 
California 
 San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center; San Diego, California 
 Southeast Florida Fusion Center; Miami, Florida 
 Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center; Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
 Southwest Texas Fusion Center; San Antonio, Texas 
 Southwestern PA Region 13 Fusion Center; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
 St. Louis Fusion Center; St. Louis, Missouri125 
Many of these parent organizations are law enforcement agencies or departments 
that have law enforcement and security responsibilities. In the majority of the cases 
where the fusion center is recognized as the state or territory’s primary fusion center, this 
owning department is often times a state law enforcement entity. One example of this 
arrangement is the New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (NJ ROIC), 
which is directly managed by the New Jersey State Police.126 In the case of recognized 
fusion centers, it is normally based in major metropolitan areas where the parent 
organization is represented by the owning city’s police department. The Southeastern 
                                                 
125. Ibid. 
126. New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center, New Jersey ROIC Privacy Policy (Trenton, 
NJ: Regional Operations Intelligence Center) accessed July 27, 2014, http://www.njsp.org/info/pdf/
042213_roic_privpolicy.pdf. 
 45
Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center (STAC) falls into this category and is directed by the 
Milwaukee Police Department.127 In other cases, the fusion center is led by different 
agency representatives. For instance, the state center in Maryland, the Maryland 
Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC), is directed by an individual from the 
Baltimore Police Department.128 The MCAC has operated with differing agency 
leadership in accordance with its management models and structure.  
B. CRITICISMS  
The varying command structures described in the section above feed into the 
perception that the Network is suffering from a chaotic management structure, which is 
unable to support consistent capabilities across the components of the organization. 
Reviewing bodies and outside entities have raised criticisms about the various command 
structures of the fusion centers to such an extent that this topic demands significant 
attention. Some view the Network as a lawless body which lacks adequate oversight for 
its operations. The concern about the inconsistent management and governance structure 
of fusion centers has been cited consistently over the past decade by independent 
observers, Congress, as well as governmental assessors. Many of the criticisms make 
claims that the current governance of the Network has negatively contributed to 
performance and efficiency.  
In the 2013, as the author of the Brennan Center study of 16 police departments, 
19 fusion centers, and 12 joint terrorism task forces, Price surmised that “many state and 
local intelligence programs lack adequate oversight.129 While federal agencies operate 
under the watch of independent inspectors general, there is often no equivalent for state 
and local information sharing ventures.”130 This report cited areas where the lack of a 
consistent centralized structure has led to differing interpretations of lawful reportable 
                                                 
127. “WiWatch,” Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center, accessed July 27, 2014, 
http://city.milwaukee.gov/WiWATCH/stac. 
128.”Our Mission,” Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center, accessed July 27, 2014, 
http://www.mcac.maryland.gov/about_mcac/our_mission/. 
129. Price, National Security and Local Police, 1.  
130. Ibid.  
 46
activities to law enforcement and fusion centers. For instance, the Houston Police 
Department operates under very broad guidelines for reporting, which amounts to police 
officers reporting any item deemed suspicious. In contrast, other departments, such as the 
Los Angeles Police Department uses specific threshold criteria such as sensitive property 
theft and the communication of a threat as requirements for reporting.131 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has also expressed concern over the 
seemingly blurry lines of authority over the fusion centers.132 German and Stanley find 
that decentralized leadership for the Network has caused disparate lines of authority that 
have led to differing translations of legal requirements. They further explain this has led 
to “policy shopping” and uneven application of law.133 Similarly, the Constitution Project 
claims that the vast array of management structures executed by elements of the Network 
greatly complicates oversight.134 These organizations suggested that fusion center 
leadership has purposefully intended to circumvent applicable law and guidelines in order 
to conduct operations in many cases.  
In 2012, the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations published findings from a 
two-year examination on federal support the Network.135 Some of the criticisms voiced 
in the report focused on the potential misuse of grant funds by fusion centers and DHS’s 
weak oversight of the Network and related intelligence operations. While focusing on the 
federal responsibilities in the realm of information sharing, the report hinted that varying 
fusion center governance and management effectiveness at when citing that the Network 
has not contributed to the disruption of terrorist organizations that could impact the 
homeland. The report’s findings cited that information processed and provided from the 
Network was often duplicative, belated, and that some success stories did not 
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demonstrate that the Network provided unique intelligence contributions for four specific 
terrorist plots reviewed by the authors.136 
The House Committee on Homeland Security published a report on fusion centers 
in 2013 that also recognizes the differing administrative environments between fusion 
centers.137 In this regard, the report recognizes that these differing structures have 
complicated clean funding lines for every center and, in many cases, have complicated 
the grants process. Authors of this report found that many areas of operation and 
integration of the Network and federal partners need to be standardized to enhance 
efficiency.138 
A report focusing on the Network produced by the Congressional Research 
Service titled Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress reviewed the status of the 
Network.139 The report identified potential risks to the centers and recommendations for 
moving forward. Some examples of highlighted concerns that the report lists are the 
diversity among the centers as well as the ownership of centers, which in some cases had 
ambiguous operating authorities.140 
C. ANALYSIS 
The inability to apply one structural template to an organization of 78 separate 
elements appears, at face value, to complicate strategic management efforts. The Network 
components operate under dozens of jurisdictional guidelines, statutes, and laws due to 
the dozens of municipal, county, state, tribal, and territory boundaries that comprise their 
areas of operation. It is these boundaries that have contributed to the variety of diverse 
administrative structures present today. Many of these organizational varieties were also 
established due to the composition of the governing bodies and/or requirements levied on 
the fusion center’s executive agency.  
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The 2011 National Network of Fusion Centers: Final Report, published by DHS 
and allied partners, highlighted the findings of a capability assessment conducted on 72 
fusion centers in an attempt to catalogue data that would help assess the maturity of the 
Network.141 The assessment was developed in a format that is repeatable in order to 
assist in the future tracking of improvements and, if applicable, backslides in the 
Network’s capabilities. Their study was based on data acquisition of 50 attributes related 
to the Network’s status of achieving the critical operating capabilities (COC) and 
enabling capabilities (EC) intended to aid in assessing fusion center capability.142 (Table 
1 provides a description of the COCs and Table 2 highlights the ECs.) 
 
Critical	Operating	Capabilities	(COC)	
COC	#1—Receive		 The ability to receive classified and 
unclassified information from federal 
partners 
COC	#2—Analyze		 The ability to assess the local implications 
of threat information through the use of a 
formal risk assessment process 
COC	#3—Disseminate		 The ability to further disseminate threat 
information to other state, local, tribal, and 
territorial entities within their jurisdictions 
COC	#4—Gather		 The ability to gather locally generated 
information, aggregate it, analyze it, and 
share it with federal partners as appropriate 
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EC	 #1—Privacy,	 Civil	 Rights,	 and	
Civil	Liberty	Protections		
The ability and commitment to protect the 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of 
all individuals 
EC	#2—Sustainment	Strategy		 The ability to establish and execute a 
sustainment strategy to ensure the long-




The ability to develop and execute a 
communications and outreach plan 
 
EC	#4—Security		 The ability to protect the security of the 
physical fusion center facility, information, 
systems, and personnel 
Table 2.   Enabling Capabilities144 
According to one of the findings from the 2011 National Network of Fusion 
Centers: Final Report, 61 fusion centers had an established governance body.145 These 
groups have varying composition and specific functions, but each has oversight 
responsibility over its respective fusion center. Many of the fusion centers are required to 
receive approval from these bodies in the case of changes to organizational structure, 
strategic direction, or policy.146 The 2012 final report for the Network, which reviewed 
the same elements as the 2011 report, found that the number of fusion centers that had an 
oversight board had increased to 68.147 The 2013 results revealed a slight continued 
increase in this area to 69.148 
Many of these governance and/or oversight structures are comprised of different 
agency representatives from different disciplines. The 2012 final report noted that 
emergency management (EM) was represented on the governance bodies 50.6 percent of 
the time, state or local homeland security agencies at 58.4 percent, and emergency 
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medical services (EMS) at 20.8 percent.149 In 2013, the representation of these structures 
was enhanced with a six, a five, and a two point increase.150 Over half of these bodies 
had State/Territorial Office of Homeland Security and police chief or sheriffs’ association 
participation. Slightly over one-third of these structures had state public health and 
healthcare represented.151  
The Columbus, Ohio-based Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) 
created the SAIC Executive Working Group, which was established to assist this center 
with establishing policy and operational guidelines as well as planning and direction.152 
As defined in SAIC policy, membership of this group is open to multiple disciplines and 
agencies.153 Another example of centers utilizing outside organizations to provide 
strategic guidance and oversight is the Phoenix-based Arizona Counter Terrorism 
Information Center (ACTIC). While the lead agency for the ACTIC is the Arizona 
Department of Public Safety (AZ DPS), the ACTIC Executive Management Board is the 
organization’s governing body. ACTIC policy clearly states that AZ DPS is “only 
responsible for providing the facility and maintaining the infrastructure.”154 The 
Executive Management Board has representation from over two dozen federal, state, and 
local agencies representing law enforcement, public safety, military, health, security, and 
fire service entities.155  
The perceptions that the Network is a lawless body without oversight or third 
party governance appears to be off base as each fusion center has specified organizational 
structures and operating policies that have been approved by the various elements 
addressed above. These concerns are not without merit, however. The roots of this 
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concern seem to be tied to the often-mistaken belief that there is no unifying chain of 
command. Seventy-eight organizations with countless partners and varying jurisdictions 
all operating under the umbrella of the Network can appear as chaos from outside the 
organization.  
Each organization is required to operate in accordance with its applicable state 
and local laws. A fusion center in Iowa is not able to execute authorities that a fusion 
center in Alabama operates under unless it is lawfully permitted by its own jurisdictional 
statutes or regulations. While each organization may have slightly different authorities, as 
with the thousands of law enforcement agencies (LEA) in the nation, there exists 
common framework that ensures consistency between these agencies.  
The perceptions that the Network is an untamed body operating under an 
administrative structure that cannot provide consistent oversight has many significant 
negative implications for the organization. Future funding decisions may be effected if 
decision makers do not understand the reasons for the current structure. As mentioned 
above, the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate have recently cited 
administrative concerns in committee reports.156 These reports highlight the variables 
that come into play when deciding if federal funding should be provided specifically for 
fusion centers and if so, what levels of federal funding should be provided.157 
Focus on addressing the perceptions about Network administration would enable 
the organization to better identify specific areas where greater consistency can be 
achieved. In areas where it cannot, more data would then be available to better articulate 
the laws, statutes, and ordinances that physically prevent federal governmental 
organizations from directly overtaking all the responsibilities of the Network. In either 
case, the perceptions that the Network lacks legitimate oversight and structure can impact 
fusion center participation locally. The number of organizations contemplating detailing 
staff to the fusion centers directly or through fusion liaison officer programs may decline 
if this perception is not resolved. Likewise, organizations that are considering supporting 
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the Network may have a more difficult time gaining approval from decision makers to do 
so if these perceptions are not addressed. 
Efforts to show how the entire Network can operate within approved guidelines 
with relevant consistency across operations may foster the development of a common 
understanding of the fusion center project. This understanding may be obtained by 
changing the frame by which some view the Network. Messaging that describes how 
individual fusion centers relate to the Network writ large as compared to how county and 
state public health organizations operate under different individual jurisdictional 
authorities but are able to contribute to the national common operating picture might aid 
in this understanding. In a different, but similar manner, strategic communications 
highlighting how fusion centers operate under their own organic authorities but are able 
to function as a unified discipline, like that of LEAs across the nation, would help 
provide context to external observers.  
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IV. ANALYSIS (INFORMATION) 
A. ELEMENTS 
This chapter will examine the different aspects of the Network’s capacity to 
conduct intelligence analysis. Raw data and information from a variety of sources may be 
disseminated to or gathered by the fusion center. This information sharing process is the 
primary responsibility of every organization in the Network. Information sharing is also a 
process that is necessary in order to conduct information analysis. Chapter V will discuss 
information sharing more thoroughly.  
Specific processing procedures will vary from each organization in the Network, 
but information is converted to intelligence once it is processed and some form of 
analytical vigor is applied to it. Taylor and Russell similarly describe information as 
unprocessed data and intelligence as analyzed information.158  
As an individual fusion center gains access to information from its allied partners 
or the public, it almost immediately begins to be processed. The data is first triaged to 
determine the priority of the information. The priority of the information will determine 
that way it will be processed, whom it will be disseminated to, as well as how quickly it 
will be processed. Information that warns of an imminent attack may be processed as a 
high priority item. High priority data may receive the benefit of having additional 
technology, resources, or analysis applied to it during processing.  
Almost a subset of the prioritize function is the categorize function. During this 
step of the process, the data is examined to determine what the subject content is of the 
information. Data that concerns a low-level criminal activity may be processed 
differently than information that identifies a key leader of a terrorist organization. 
Depending on the subject area, the information may be further processed by a subject 
matter expert or an analyst who specializes on the subject content. This step of the 
process also attempts to determine if any further processing of the information is 
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required. However, the data may represent background information for the organization’s 
situational awareness and not require any additional action.  
Once the data is processed in accordance with its priority and categorized, the 
analyst will conduct a review of information and intelligence holdings. This step in the 
process can be viewed as the first opportunity where the analyst can “connect the dots.” 
This review will attempt to identify any finished intelligence or raw data that might be 
associated with the specific subject or activity of interest. Holdings concerning adjacent 
topic matters that could provide context on the subject area of interest may be highlighted 
as well. 
If the initial prior steps in this process are somewhat mechanical, this is the point 
of the process that is more on the art side. The analyst will leverage and overlay context 
on the data. This context is knowledge on the topical area acquired through experience, 
research, colleagues, and training (some examples are knowledge of historical patterns, 
regional norms, group hermeneutics, etc.). At this point, the information will be 
examined to determine if there are any relevant areas that require additional and/or more 
specific data. These identified gaps will be highlighted and further processed and 
disseminated to operational entities in the form of collection requirements or information 
needs (formal or informal collection taskings to field elements). 
At this point in the process, the analyst combines the collective body of 
information received in the previous steps and makes a formal judgment. These 
judgments or assessments may be on the likeliness that an organization is to conduct an 
attack or if an entity has interest in gaining a certain capability. The significance of the 
remaining gaps or to what extent the information can be corroborated will determine the 
overall confidence level of the assessment.  
Once the information is supported by supplemental information, context, and an 
assessment, determination on classification is required. During the analysis process, 
pieces of information that are reviewed together at times become more sensitive than the 
sum of the individual data components. The sensitivity could cause previous unclassified 
information to be elevated to a higher classification which may restrict or alter the 
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dissemination process.159 The final classification will determine who the recipients of the 
intelligence will be. (Figure 2 generally describes the process for converting information 
to intelligence)160 
 
Figure 2.  Information to Intelligence Conversion Process 
                                                 
159. Because fusion centers are owned and operated by state, local, tribal, and/or territorial entities 
they are not authorized to formally apply a national security classification such as Confidential, Secret, or 
Top Secret to products. They do routinely apply handling caveats to intelligence such as Sensitive But 
Unclassified, Law Enforcement Sensitive, and/or For Official Use Only. 
160. Intake and disseminate are part of intelligence processing and are significant elements of 
information sharing as described in Chapter V. 
•Intake (of data from source of information) 
•Prioritize (imminent, routine, low etc.)
•Categorize (does information require further processing, what type of data was 
received)
• Review Holdings (identify intelligence and information which could be related or 
associated with the received information)
•Apply Context (supplement data with applied historical, regional, group norms etc)
•Identify Gaps (highlight areas where there are gaps in the information)
•Assess (combine raw data with current holdings and context adjusting for gaps to 
make a judgement)
•Classify (determine if sum of information is more sensitive than the parts)
•Disseminate (according to the senistivity and priority)
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B. CRITICISMS 
Second to only privacy complaints (which will be discussed in Chapter VII) 
analysis seems to be a significant issue. Not unlike the organizations that comprise the 
intelligence community, the Network has received many complaints and criticisms 
concerning fusion centers’ ability to conduct analysis. Many organizations who have 
consumed products generated by the Network have voiced negative opinions about the 
quality of analytical products. 
Queries conducted by the Rand Corporation with state and local law enforcement 
found that a majority of analytical products produced by the Network were not of high 
intelligence value.161 The greatest complaints appear to be that much of the intelligence 
provided was viewed as not able to inform immediate operations. The report mentioned 
that the view that federal products getting passed through the Network were also of no 
immediate operation value and were merely a weak attempt at sharing information. The 
study cited claims that the general view of participants was that 24 of 77 fusion centers 
were performing well. No specific data was provided or specific criteria was identified 
that was used by the participants to aid in the determination of effective or ineffective 
performance.162 
In a review of national security and law enforcement initiatives, the Brennan 
Center found that the fusion centers produce, at best, inconsistent intelligence products, 
and at worst, poor quality.163 They contributed this largely due to weak analytical 
standards as well as other factors, such as lack of oversight and a decentralized structure. 
They also conclude that many post-911 initiatives’ (including the Network) rates of 
growth have out-paced the government’s ability to provide oversight and ability to ensure 
organizations are accountable for their activities.164 
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A 2012 Senate report listing the findings from an investigation on DHS and the 
Network claimed that intelligence products produced by fusion centers was of little help 
to federal counterterrorism efforts.165 While focusing mostly on data reported out by the 
Network, it cited a wide variety of concerns ranging from P/CRCL to information value. 
The report indicated that some Network products provided intelligence that was of little 
or no value.166 The criticisms against the Network’s capability to conduct analysis are 
widespread, but those commenting appear to make the same general subjective 
statements. 
C. ANALYSIS 
Almost as basic to the Network as the information sharing function, conducting 
analysis of reporting and data is key to a fusion center’s operation. Analysis comprises 
critical operating capability (COC) 2 and is a necessary function that a fusion center must 
execute to convert information to intelligence.167 The Network organizations may differ 
on analyst staffing levels, but each fusion center conducts some form of analysis. 
The need for fusion centers to address and continually make improvements to this 
core function is essential to the Network’s strategic goal to be viewed as analytical 
centers of excellence. If efforts in this area are ignored, individual fusion centers risk the 
perception that they are unable to execute their mission. Perceptions that the Network 
cannot conduct analysis of value could cause adjacent agencies to be less likely to 
continue to contribute raw data to fusion centers. A reduction of fusion centers’ intake of 
information would subsequently result in the Network being unable to create any original 
analysis to the extent that the Network’s status in COC 2 decreases.  
A common adage in the Intelligence Community (IC) is that analysis is more of 
an art than a science. In spite of frameworks, guidelines, and common training, the core 
of analysis is providing context and ultimately making judgments. It is not a rarity if two 
analysts reviewing the same information and intelligence come up with two different 
                                                 
165. U.S. Senate, Federal Support for and Involvement, 83, 96. 
166. Ibid., 31–32, 35. 
167. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Annual Fusion Center Assessment.” 
 58
forecasts about an event. In most cases, these assessments would be slightly different and 
not have findings that are polar opposites. The Network is not alone in receiving 
criticisms on the quality of its analysis. Policymakers and consumers of analytical 
products have commonly voiced their frustration with analysis at the IC.168 Often 
analysis is criticized for being too general or nebulous to directly inform operations.169 In 
other cases, analysis is viewed as not being timely enough or making judgments on what 
the consumer deems is common knowledge.170 Generally, these complaints are founded 
in reality, but often times, they are due to unrealistic expectations or lack of 
understanding that strategic intelligence is intended to aid the consumer in long range 
decision making.  
The 2012 Final Report on the Network found a slight increase over the 2011 
report on the Network’s ability to conduct analysis.171 Seventy-four fusion centers were 
able to achieve 10 of the 11 attributes used to measure COC 2.172 One hundred percent of 
the centers involved in the report were found to have conducted analytical assessments on 
a variety of activities in their areas of responsibility in all but one center contributed to 
vulnerability assessments.173 Many of the other attributes were obtained by an 
overwhelming majority of the centers. The one outlier of the findings in this category was 
the Network’s ability to contribute to a nation-level risk assessment which only forty-one 
fusion centers achieved.174 This attribute increased to 49 centers contributing in 2013.175  
Collectively, the 2011, 2012, and 2013 final reports largely paint a positive 
picture of the analytical capabilities of the Network, but negative perceptions may stem 
from a breakdown of communications between fusion centers and stakeholders and/or 
                                                 
168. Maurice R. Greenberg and Richard N. Haass, Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. 
Intelligence (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), http://fas.org/irp/cfr.html. 
169. U.S. Senate, Federal Support for and Involvement, 32.  
170. Ibid., 40. 
171. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers, 15–17. 
172. Ibid., 15. 
173. Ibid. 
174. Ibid. 
175. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers, 34. 
 59
customer expectations. As mentioned above, the perception that the Network is unable to 
conduct analysis is usually communicated in very generic manners. The most specific 
criticisms of this category appear to normally be stressed in general consumer frustration, 
such as “your products are of low value.” These types of comments are not very helpful 
to the authors who are interested in knowing what specifically made the product poor. 
While about 86 percent of the Network had a feedback mechanism, there is no data to 
suggest the rate of responses from consumers.176 The 2012 Final Report focused solely 
on the absence or presence of this mechanism so a value judgment is difficult to 
determine.177 
As mentioned previously and witnessed in criticisms against analysis conducted 
in the IC, some of the negative perceptions on the Network’s ability to conduct analysis 
could be due to few factors.178 A lack of understanding of the intelligence process, 
intelligence analysis, and the purposes of strategic intelligence by some stakeholders 
consuming the Network’s intelligence products may be confounding useful feedback. 
Many of the Network’s partners who review their analysis are not traditional consumers 
of intelligence products. Even in the law enforcement community where crime analysis is 
routinely conducted there does not appear to be much of a distinction between the two 
types of analysis. Crime analysis tends to focus on historical statistics to gauge 
performance of an organization or initiative. This type of analysis often has a more 
defined data set measure relying on Uniform Crime Reporting or on similar concrete 
categories.179 The familiarity and understanding of crime analysis from partners may be 
causing an erroneous projection of similar solid and tactical expectations from the 
strategic products of the Network.  
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Along the lines of providing specific feedback to the Network, one item where 
there appears to be limited or no data and further research could be warranted is how 
consumers have attempted to communicate their standing information needs (SIN) and 
intelligence requirements. Information/intelligence requirements allow an organization to 
communicate with its customer base the items that it deems priority or essential to the 
organization’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities. Ideally, a fusion center’s SIN reflect 
the items that are relevant to the homeland security enterprise, its leadership, as well as 
its customer base. Seventy-six percent of the Network was identified as having developed 
SIN.180 While the development of fusion center SIN is commendable currently only 
thirty-four percent of fusion centers align their products to these SIN.181 Approximately 
half of the Network was identified as engaging various disciplines comprising its 
stakeholder groups in the creation or update of their SIN.182 
Continued training would allow the Network to maintain and expand its ability to 
conduct analysis.183 The development of an analyst certification program would help 
professionalize the fusion center analyst field and provide a career development path. 
Expansion of the SIN requirements to further encourage the Network to involve 
stakeholders in review and updates to SIN would help in educating partners on the 
intelligence process. Furthermore, it would provide the opportunity to recalibrate the 
direction of the fusion center’s local/region focus if needed. 
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V. INFORMATION SHARING 
A. ELEMENTS 
This chapter discusses the category of information sharing which consists of the 
ability to inform and connect partner agencies with information to guide operations and 
decision making. As previously mentioned, fusion centers were essentially created to fill 
a perceived gap in the sharing of information between federal and state, local, tribal, and 
territorial (SLTT) levels of government. The 9/11 attacks may have been the driving 
factor that put a spotlight on this deficiency, but organizations (especially law 
enforcement and intelligence entities) had historically struggled with the exchange of 
information between agencies that had a culture that viewed information 
compartmentalization as a necessary protocol for operations security (OPSEC).  
Sharing of information touches on three of the COCs (receive, disseminate, and 
gather) and is viewed as a cornerstone activity that the Network needs to execute in order 
to carry out its duties.184 In essence, each fusion center acts as an information hub in its 
area of operations. Partnering agencies that are involved with operations and information 
that has relevance to homeland security provide data to the fusion centers. The fusion 
centers process this information and help the information provider determine if and to 
whom the information needs to be distributed to. 
There are many ways in which the Network executes its information sharing 
responsibilities between all levels of the government, private sector, and the citizenry. A 
few generic examples of how information sharing is routinely conducted by the Network 
depicting reception, dissemination, and gathering, are provided below.  
1. Information Sharing Example One  
A local law enforcement agency (LEA) encounters a subject involved in what 
they deem as a suspicious activity with homeland security implications. The LEA then 
processes the information in accordance with its internal applicable standing operating 
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procedures. The information is then provided to the fusion center for situational 
awareness or in order to query the fusion center for more information on the subject. The 
fusion center identifies that the subject has ties to other jurisdictions and provides the 
information to these jurisdictions either directly (in the case that the jurisdiction falls 
under that fusion center’s area of operations) or indirectly (in the case that the jurisdiction 
falls outside of the fusion center’s area of operations) via another fusion center. This 
process helps ensure that the relevant information is known to the concerned 
jurisdictions. 
2. Information Sharing Example Two 
A public safety organization observes an activity deemed to have potential 
homeland security implications. This information is shared with the fusion center that has 
responsibility in the region. As in the above example, the fusion center processes the 
information and disseminates this information with the LEA who has jurisdiction over the 
area of activity. This LEA conducts activities or investigates the suspicious activity and 
reports the outcomes or findings back to the fusion center.  
Essentially this process is a two-way communication between the Network and its 
partners. The fusion center acts as the connective tissue for agencies and organizations 
which may not otherwise interact. The federal law enforcement and intelligence IC have 
adopted the Network as single points of contact to distribute information and intelligence. 
In the same manner, these entities utilize the Network as a tool that can be leveraged to 
lawfully gather domestic information of value to National Security. (Figure 3 depicts one 
theoretical example of information flow up to and through a fusion center.)  
 










Generally speaking, there is an expectation from the citizenry and private sectors 
for government organizations involved with law enforcement and intelligence missions to 
appropriately share information in a manner which aids in the defense of the homeland. 
That said, there have been criticisms raised about the process, the manner, and the 
amount of information that the Network has shared. At times, concerns about with whom 
the information has been shared with has been the subject of concern. (This is discussed 
more in Chapter VII). 
In a report reviewing the sharing of information concerning terrorism and 
suspicious activity reports (SAR), the Congressional Research Service (CRS) cited some 
areas where the Network’s performance was assessed as subpar.185 It mentioned that 
while fusion centers may have excelled in the area of dissemination of products, the 
fusing of so many data systems has caused unnecessary redundancies. These 
redundancies may also lead to confusion and complicate the consumer’s effort to 
determine what information was relevant. Furthermore, the wide dissemination of 
information sometimes seen as duplicative may be overwhelming the recipient of the 
information. As mentioned in Chapter IV, quality of the information shared was raised as 
well.186  
The GAO reviewed the same topics and produced a report that raised similar to 
those of the CRS report and also additional criticisms.187 Surveys conducted with 
officials associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) resulted in the opinion 
that some terrorism-related information was not being disseminated from the Network to 
its organization. The GAO report also mentioned the concern that in some cases, fusion 
centers were investigating the information prior to sharing it with the FBI.188 A 2014 
Rand study generically mentioned that there were regions where fusion centers were not 
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providing information to adjacent police departments.189 These are valid concerns 
because delay in sharing of this information to the FBI and federal government could put 
the nation at risk of an attack or diminish the federal government’s ability to determine if 
activities observed in one jurisdiction are connected to activities in another area of the 
U.S. or international landscape.  
In some cases, concerns over the timeliness of information has been discussed. A 
Senate review of 13 months’ worth of DHS reports from fusion centers found that in 
general, the information provided was untimely and duplicative.190 Some of the 
information was found to have already been shared and processed through other 
governmental channels.191 It is important to note that this reporting review was looking at 
information processed through DHS and had other findings indicating that internal DHS 
processes were negatively impacting the timeliness of reporting.192  
C. ANALYSIS 
The Network appears to vigorously perform its information sharing mission 
utilizing various methods, but perceptions to the contrary are not without merit. Fusion 
centers produce an array of intelligence and information products that they distribute 
across the nation. Many of these products are in the form of bulletins and reports, but 
they also regularly provide briefings, presentations, and verbal communications to their 
stakeholders.  
In order to survive in any capacity, the Network has to address these information 
sharing criticisms directly and combat any opposition to its ability to perform this 
function. Increases in perceptions that the Network cannot or does not share will impact 
the centers through support, staff, funding, collection, coordination, and various other 
ways. Organizations in general and especially those in the law enforcement discipline 
will not share with an organization they perceive will not return the favor. From a 
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Congressional and state standpoint, funding for an organization that was created to 
manage information flow would cease. Parent organizations would most likely 
implement major restructure or reduce staff in this case as well.  
The 2012 Final Report found that while the Network rating of COC 3 
(disseminate) received the lowest overall rating as compared to all of the other COC 
categories, this category was the most improved from 2011.193 This indicates that the 
Network is increasingly implementing measures to improve their sharing of information 
with stakeholders. Between 2011 and 2012, a 16 point increase to 95 percent was 
recorded in the final reports concerning fusion centers with established policies that 
address timely dissemination of information to stakeholders.194 The 2013 report found 
continued improvement in this category as well to 96 percent.195 
Areas where there appears to be continued shortfalls are in a fusion center’s 
ability to verify whether products and communications are being received by their 
customers. This is a key factor that can contribute to uneven perception in this area. The 
Network may view that it is routinely communicating successfully with its stakeholders, 
but only 45 percent even have the ability to confirm product delivery.196 There is 
currently no data available that indicates if any of the fusion centers with this ability have 
actually attempted to evaluate the rates of product reception nor what percentages of 
reception have been recorded. Ironically, SLTT partners have voiced their opinions that 
product feedback was important in determining if their information was of value.197 If 
feedback was viewed as a priority element, one of the first steps in facilitating a feedback 
mechanism might be to confirm that information was being received by stakeholders.  
Perceptions that the Network does not share all terrorism information with the 
FBI and at times, may open up investigations prior to sharing with the federal 
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government, may be difficult to overcome. The FBI is the lead federal law enforcement 
agency responsible for investigating cases involving terrorism.198 While there are many 
differing agency definitions of terrorism, most agencies view terrorism as nefarious 
activities involving the intent to intimidate, coerce, or retaliate against the U.S. 
government. The FBI’s designation as the primary investigating agency in the terrorism 
category potentially puts the organization at odds with the Network whose primary 
responsibility is to collect, identify, analyze, and disseminate information (which includes 
items associated with terrorism).  
SAR information that is received by the Network may not be initially flagged as 
associated with terrorism. This information may be processed under normal fusion center 
protocols and goes through a vetting process. In the case of fusion centers with 
investigative capabilities, part of this vetting process may involve conducting a formal or 
preliminary investigation. During this vetting process it may be determined that the SAR 
is associated with indicators of terrorism. At that point the information is disseminated to 
federal agencies to include the FBI and DHS. In this instance, the information sharing 
process would have worked as designed from the perspective of the Network. The FBI 
could view the process for this example as the fusion center over-stepping its authorities.  
In spite of concerns about the Network’s ability or willingness to provide 
information to the U.S. government, fusion centers appear to be increasingly gathering 
and disseminating information through the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report 
Initiative (NSI). The NSI is a DHS-led, collaborative program with federal and SLTT 
partners that provides training, technology, and processes for the collection, 
identification, analysis, and data management of SAR information.199 A 2013 GAO 
report on information sharing found that NSI participants (of which the Network is the 
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main contributing entity) have increased their reporting contributions 750 percent (3,256 
to 27,855) from the beginning of 2010 to the fall of 2012.200  
There is currently no data to identify how many reports that met the reporting 
threshold that were processed by the Network may have been withheld from NSI. 
However, the significant increase in dissemination supports the assessments of increases 
in the Network’s ability to execute COC 3 (disseminate) detailed in the 2011, 2012 and 
2013 Network reports.201 This upsurge in dissemination also suggests a greater 
willingness by fusion centers to provide SAR data to the federal government if there ever 
was any reluctance to do so. 
As stated in the arguments portion of this chapter, numerous criticisms have been 
communicated indicating that the Network produces massive amounts of information 
which is of little value. The GAO found that opinions from a sampling of Joint Terrorism 
Task Force (JTTF) officials indicated SAR reporting does not in fact cause a flood of 
useless information.202 DHS I&A reviewed 3044 SAR inputs spanning the 2007 to 2011 
time frame and determined that 69 percent of the reports were of value. Furthermore, 
SAR data contributed to the initiation of 1,200 FBI terrorism investigations between 2010 
and 2012 indicating a 75 percent increase over the reporting period.203  
The ISE’s functional standard documents the reporting threshold for SAR and 
defines behaviors that could indicate pre-operational planning of terrorism or other 
criminal activity. (Table 3 and Table 4 identify the behavior categories that represent the 
criteria guidance for SAR.)204 The NSI requires the use of the ISE functional standard 
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criteria for inputting SAR data into the system.205 The functional standard could actually 
be cause for some of the information sharing criticisms due to misalignment of the 
functional standard with other agency threshold for terrorism reporting. FBI headquarters 
officials have previously voiced concerns that their investigation guidelines are broader 
than the functional standard’s criteria in areas specifically related to terrorism financing 
and subject location.206 The narrower criteria as defined in the functional standard may 
be causing the unintended consequence of preventing limited SAR information from 
being shared beyond the source organization. 
 
 
DEFINED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND POTENTIAL TERRORISM NEXUS 
ACTIVITY 
Category Description 
Breach/Attempted Intrusion Unauthorized personnel attempting to or actually entering a 
restricted area or protected site. 
Misrepresentation Presenting false or misusing insignia, documents, and/or 
identification, to misrepresent one’s affiliation to cover possible 
illicit activity. 
Theft/Loss/Diversion Stealing or diverting something associated with a facility/
infrastructure. 
Sabotage/Tampering/Vandalism Damaging, manipulating, or defacing part of a facility/
infrastructure or protected site. 
Cyber Attack Compromising, or attempting to compromise or disrupt an 
organization’s information technology infrastructure. 
Expressed or Implied Threat Communicating a spoken or written threat to damage or 
compromise a facility/infrastructure. 
Aviation Activity Operation of an aircraft in a manner that reasonably may be 
interpreted as suspicious, or posing a threat to people or property.  
Table 3.   ISE SAR Criteria Guidance: Defined Criminal Activity and 
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POTENTIAL CRIMINAL OR NON-CRIMINAL ACTIVITY REQUIRING 
ADDITIONAL FACT INFORMATION DURING INVESTIGATION 
Category Description 
Eliciting Information Questioning individuals at a level beyond mere 
curiosity about particular facets of a facility’s or 
building’s purpose, operations, security 
procedures, etc., that would arouse suspicion in a 
reasonable person 
Testing or Probing of Security Deliberate interactions with, or challenges to, 
installations, personnel, or systems that reveal 
physical, personnel, or cyber security 
capabilities. 
Recruiting Building of operations teams and contacts, 
personnel data, banking data or travel data. 
Photography Taking pictures or video of facilities, buildings, 
or infrastructure in a manner that would arouse 
suspicion in a reasonable person. 
Observation/Surveillance Demonstrating unusual interest in facilities, 
buildings, or infrastructure beyond mere casual or 
professional interest such that a reasonable 
person would consider the activity suspicious. 
Materials Acquisition/Storage Acquisition and/or storage of unusual quantities 
of materials such that a reasonable person would 
suspect possible criminal activity. 
Acquisition of Expertise Attempts to obtain or conduct training in security 
concepts or capabilities such that a reasonable 
person would suspect possible criminal activity. 
Weapons Discovery Discovery of unusual amounts of weapons or 
explosives that would arouse suspicion in a 
reasonable person. 
Sector-Specific Incident Actions associated with a characteristic of unique 
concern to specific sectors, with regard to their 
personnel, facilities, systems or functions. 
Table 4.   Potential Criminal or Non-criminal Activity Requiring Additional 
Fact Information During Investigation208 
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The attacks on 911 encouraged the change of our domestic security landscape and 
what we assess as our greatest threats to the homeland. Public opinion and IC 
assessments ensured the ascension of terrorism prevention to one of the nation’s top 
priorities of the National Security Strategy.209 The overwhelming focus on terrorism 
prevention and response drove the reorganization and reprioritization of many existing 
agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI. These factors also 
spurred the creation of entities such as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI), DHS, as well as fusion centers.  
As discussed previously, the Network was originally thought to be able to 
supplement national law enforcement and IC efforts to protect the homeland. The Fusion 
Center guidelines generally define fusion centers as organizations composed of multiple 
agencies that possess resources and expertise that will enhance homeland defense. The 
value proposition relies on the ability of the Network to identify, deter, investigate, and 
counter criminal and terrorist activity.210  
Like many of the other components of this federation of fusion centers, individual 
organizational mission statements are unified by the spirit of this strategic functional 
view. However, they differ in their interpretation of what activities fall into their scope of 
responsibilities. This chapter examines the varying opinions concerning the mission 
space of the Network.  
While there are 78 fusion centers with as many different mission statements, they 
can each be categorized into three different general types: terrorist threat focused, 
terrorist and criminal threat focused (all-crimes), and all threat focused (all-hazards). 
These differences in the fusion center’s angles of aperture concerning homeland security 
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have contributed to negative perceptions of the Network because it may foster the 
appearance that the Network is not unified.  
The Statewide Information and Analysis Center (SIAC) based in Sandy, Utah lists 
its mission as “a public-safety partnership designed to collect, analyze, and disseminate 
intelligence in order to protect Utahans.”211 While the SIAC’s mission does not explicitly 
lend to an easy categorization of its mission and appears to generally support those items 
highlighted in the Baseline Capabilities guidelines, it essentially falls into the all-crimes 
category due to its support functions.212 The SIAC executes its mission conducting 
analysis of criminal activities falling into the categories of: organized crime, gang, fraud, 
counter-narcotics, as well as counter-terrorism. Each are in line with many of the 
traditional criminal activity categories.213 
The New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC) based in Santa Fe, 
New Mexico appears to derive its mission from its parent organization, the New Mexico 
Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management.214 The NMASIC lists 
border, criminal, and terrorist threats as being under the organization’s purview 
indicating an all-crimes focus.215 Further examination of NMASIC’s self-identified 
responsibilities indicates that the organization holds a counterterrorism focus of 
operations. This fusion center describes its role as a “central point in New Mexico for the 
collection, analysis, and timely dissemination of terrorism-related information.”216 
NMASIC also refrains from addressing specific criminal activities in its objectives.217 
The Louisiana State Analytical and Fusion Exchange (LASAFE) based in Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana mentions that its focus areas concern criminal and terrorist activities as 
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well as natural disasters and events.218 As well as mentioning the former activities, the 
LASAFE mentions that it “will support the state during major disasters and emergencies 
by gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information to assist relevant agencies.”219 
The LASAFE’s all-hazards approach is most likely due to the historic widespread 
impacts that hurricanes have had in the region. The operating environment in Louisiana 
appears to be the driving influence of its evolution to the all-hazards mission. 
In his examination of the future of LEA surveillance operations, Torin recognizes 
the counterterrorism role of the Network and compares it with intelligence-led policing 
efforts underway in many LEAs.220  He also cites the “expansion” of the Network’s 
mission space into the realm of all-hazards threats. This expansion of mission from 
terrorism to all-hazards is attributed to fusion centers attempting to align themselves with 
DHS priorities in order to justify application of DHS grant funding for operations.221 
Whether motivated by perceived funding requirements, prevalent threats in the operating 
environment, or simply pre-existing organizational relationships (or lack thereof), the 
Network has experienced an organization in which different segments have viewed their 
responsibilities as more encompassing than others.  
B. CRITICISMS 
Some critics of the varied mission sets of the Network hold the opinion that the 
original intent behind the development of fusion centers was to prevent another 9/11 
event or similar incident perpetrated by a terrorist group. These same individuals feel that 
fusion centers should share the belief that terrorism is the primary and sole responsibility 
of their organizations and the Network. Others have concerns that an expansion of the 
mission space beyond terrorism dilutes the Network’s ability to support the national 
efforts to counter terrorism. 
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Taylor and Russell question the SLTT focus on terrorism.222 They speculate that 
most LEAs have continued to direct their resources on issues that assist in combating 
criminal activities. They claim that typical analysis generated by a fusion center revolves 
around advanced crime analysis, citing the charting of drug trafficking organizations, 
stolen property, and human trafficking as examples. Assertions are made that much of the 
Network’s contributions focus on specific jurisdictional crime reduction efforts or 
supporting local police leadership’s requests for statistical data. They also state that many 
of the fusion centers have evolved into emergency response centers. In conjunction with 
these issues, they also express concerns that much of the Network has lacked strategic 
focus and has embraced a tactical bend to operations and analysis.223  
The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations voiced its displeasure 
with what it claimed was the Network’s lack of priority on terrorism.224 In its survey of 
62 fusion centers in 2010, it found that 25 fusion centers had no mention of terrorism in 
their mission statements. The subcommittee’s findings also revealed that five of the 
centers had adjusted their missions to highlight public safety elements and de-emphasized 
counterterrorism.225  
In their study of the Network and post 911 security organizations, Monahan and 
Regan argue that fusion centers have strayed from the intended focus on terrorism to all-
crimes.226 They claim that the current priority focus on traditional crime is influenced by 
the organization’s ability to obtain operational funding from state and local coffers. They 
do offer the possibility that some criminal activities could be precursor events to 
terrorism.227 The Brennan Center for Justice also expressed concerns about the 
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Network’s mission space. Its report describes the Network’s mission as “not uniform or 
particularly defined.”228 
The House Committee on Homeland Security defines the mission of the Network 
as much broader than counterterrorism.229 In its Majority Staff Report on the National 
Network of Fusion Centers, it highlights that one of the Network’s positive attributes is 
its independence from the federal government and unique subject matter expertise. The 
report refers to the Network’s responsibilities as supporting “the National homeland 
security mission, which includes counterterrorism” indicating that fusion centers should 
not exclusively focus on terrorism. The subcommittee did comment that there is an 
uneven focus across the Network concerning terrorism analysis. It also point outs that 
there currently is not an adequate measurement to determine how well the Network is 
performing its counterterrorism mission.230 
C. ANALYSIS 
The Network’s varying interpretation of its mission set stems from the different 
political pressures, environmental impacts, and perceived threat priorities unique to each 
jurisdiction. Fusion centers that view their mission as one that encompasses the all-
hazards approach may reside in areas where their regions have experienced significant 
environmental threats and/or are closely organizationally aligned with their jurisdiction’s 
emergency management agencies. Those fusion centers that have taken the all-crimes 
approach may have experienced the pressures to perform more regular services to SLTT 
public safety entities in order to justify funding and/or hold the perspective that criminal 
activities precede and coincide with terrorist activities. 
The category of mission-space has the potential of causing negative secondary 
effects if measures are not taken by the Network to address the criticisms. On one hand, 
narrowing the mission area for every fusion center to focus solely on terrorism may 
actually degrade the Network’s overall capability. Singular focus on terrorism would 
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most likely contribute to a decline in staff detailed from outside agencies that perceive 
that terrorism is not their primary mission. State and local agency provided funding could 
also diminish for a similar reason: the common beliefs that counter terrorism efforts are 
the primary responsibility of the federal government. On the other hand, the migration 
towards an all-hazards focus carries with it some risk to the Network unless there is 
active engagement by the Network to address the discourse on this topic. Federal funding 
that commonly supports the Network was originally intended to support counterterrorist 
operations and could be withdrawn unless there is a common understanding of the 
mission landscape.  
Many external observers of the Network who may have issue with the differing 
administrative organizations which were described in Chapter III also have concerns with 
the mission-sets for similar reasons. The belief that the Network is one seamless entity 
with a centralized organizational structure with identical missions is not rare or 
uncommon. This perception is likely due to the lack of complete understanding of the 
Network’s composition—that the organization is more of an umbrella entity that 
encompasses many organizations. Along the same lines, those criticisms do not often 
appear to consider the varying operating environments or priority threat actors of a given 
area of operations which have led to these different mission-sets. 
DHS OIG investigated the relationships between the Network and emergency 
operations centers (EOC) in 2011 and offered recommendations to enhance future 
collaboration between the two entities.231 The report cited how DOJ and DHS felt that in 
the event of a crisis disaster (whether man-made or natural), intelligence needs to be 
accessible to response/recovery agencies and response coordinating bodies, such as 
EOCs. They recognized that DHS lacks the authority to compel the Network to adopt a 
specific approach and communicated concerns that an all-crimes centric mission may 
deter coordination with response and preparedness organizations. In their findings, they 
assessed that a majority of the network was focused on law enforcement (LE) concerns 
and did not necessarily put a premium on the all-hazards focus. Their research also 
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indicated that fusion centers that are co-located with EOCs and sharing reporting 
authorities are more likely to have a higher level of collaboration and integration.232 This 
reporting agency supports the idea of an all-hazards model and stresses concerns about 
what is perceived as an overly LE-centric focus. 
Many centers migrated or were established with broader responsibilities than 
terrorism by design. Some thoughts communicated by law enforcement officers (LEO) 
have been that terrorism or terrorist activities do not happen in the United States with 
enough frequency to keep the Network fully engaged on a continuous basis.233 Terrorism 
may be one of the national priorities, but it may be viewed by many as a high impact low 
probability event.  
This perception of terrorism stems from the images of the 911 attacks, the 2005 
London bombings, the 2004 Madrid bombings, and other catastrophic events.234 These 
major attacks act as the reference point for a typical American’s thoughts of what a 
terrorist attack is and anything less than a major attack may not register as a terrorist 
event. The above-mentioned examples do not represent the vast majority of terrorist 
activities that are observed in the United States and around the globe. A majority of 
terrorist activities in the United States have been low-level events against property or 
equipment (in the case of anarchist, animal, and environmental extremists).235  
Often times, these more frequent terrorist attacks do not make it on the front page 
of a local newspaper or are not even categorized as a terrorist attack. Many would be 
surprised that affiliates of the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front 
conducted approximately 239 terrorism attacks between 1995 and 2010 alone.236 
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Analysis and investigation of these types of events may start with an arson investigation 
or reporting of defacement of property. In the examples of arson and property damage, it 
is likely these would be initially reported in line with regular criminal activities. A fusion 
center executing an all-crimes mission may be more likely to be the recipient of like 
reporting from the field over a center that is marketed strictly as terrorism focused entity.  
Many leaders hold the opinion that the amount of instances of traditional criminal 
activity dwarfs that of terrorism. These beliefs have led to the expansion of fusion center 
mission responsibilities beyond terrorist activities. One LEO who conducted a DHS 
funded study on the fusion process found that fusion centers that solely focus on 
terrorism may risk the deterioration of their investigative and analytical skill-sets due to 
the lack of terrorist-related events, tips, and/or leads.237 A fusion center director provided 
testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee in 2011 and cited hundreds of violent criminal events that occurred each year 
in his jurisdiction implying that violent criminal activities are as significant to his 
community as any other threat.238 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) also referenced the prevailing 
thoughts about mission expansion to all-crimes (or all-hazards).239 It found that centers 
created shortly after the 9/11 attacks tended to initially focus on counterterrorism efforts 
while those that developed later on tended to focus on all-crimes or all-hazards. The 
authors of the CRS report also explained that this expansion was motivated by the need 
for increased partner buy-in and a greater need to obtain grant resources.240 The ACLU 
has echoed similar thoughts and offered its view that competition for grants may have 
contributed to the migration to an all-hazards focus.241 This expansion of mission has 
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been seen as “mission creep” from the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) 
perspective.242 
A representative from the Washington (DC) Regional Threat and Analysis Center 
(WRTAC), which was executing an all-crimes focus at the time of an interview, 
mentioned his view of the mission expansion.243 He explained that they had a criminal 
focus and felt that as long as terrorism was a crime, they were on par with their mission 
orientation.244 
In essence, the perceptions that the Network has an array of differing missions 
and is operating along various paths are valid. These facts appear to be subject of 
exaggeration and often are taken out of context. In many areas, a sole terrorism focus 
would diminish a fusion center’s capability to gain partnerships from external agencies 
whose focus is on items that impact public safety rather than solely on terrorism. In other 
areas, inclusion of natural hazards ensures collaboration from non-LE organizations and 
is in-line with that region’s top tier threats. Review of the Network component’s mission 
statements also reveal that the core functions highlighted in the baseline capabilities 
documents are embedded in the fabric of each of the fusion centers. Ultimately, every 
fusion center in the Network appears to strive to be able to gather, receive, analyze, share, 
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VII. PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
A. ELEMENTS 
Personal privacy, the rights offered to every citizen, and individual civil liberties 
are part of the fabric of the nation. Each of these items is ingrained into the core beliefs, 
values, and rights that represent part of the promise that the United States of America 
offers it citizens. This chapter will examine some of the issues surrounding privacy, civil 
rights and civil liberties (P/CRCL) that often counterbalance the argument for increased 
law enforcement and intelligence activities in the defense of the homeland. Most people 
agree that providing a safe and secure environment for its citizenry is the government’s 
responsibility. On the other hand, events and circumstances that have led to times of 
increased security have challenged the nation’s moniker of ‘the land of the free.’ 
While the U.S. Constitution does not specifically offer the citizenry the right to 
privacy, the Bill of Rights is generally believed to offer protections for certain aspects of 
privacy, specifically the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Civil rights are 
generally derived from the fourteenth amendment. Civil liberties are generally believed to 
be generated from both the Constitution and Bill of Rights.245 
There have been many events in the nation’s past that have led to increased LE 
and intelligence operations that have come under scrutiny and were subsequently 
determined to have violated P/CRCL principles. The CIA’s HT-Lingual program, which 
covertly monitored mail communications (many consisting of those of U.S. citizens), was 
found to be an illegal process violating citizen rights.246 The FBI’s Counterintelligence 
Program more commonly known as “COINTELPRO,” which was an initiative that 
targeted U.S. citizens who were deemed subversive, was later discontinued for similar 
reasons.247 The National Security Agency’s (NSA) operation dubbed “Minaret,” which 
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intercepted communications from many U.S. citizens including elected U.S. leaders, was 
found to be an illegal practice that led to the creation of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act in 1978.248 
The above examples of IC and LE operations, which were later deemed to be 
inappropriate, illegal, and/or a violation of P/CRCL principles, are not simply relics of a 
by-gone era. Security and P/CRCL have always been and will forever be a part of the 
nation’s homeland security discourse. The most recent events that highlight these issues 
involve the NSA’s operations involving the collection of American citizen’s 
communications by the IC.249 Especially in the United States, when the discussion of 
security takes place, P/CRCL will certainly be in the conversation.  
B. CRITICISMS 
P/CRCL concerns commonly rank at or near the top of every LE community or IC 
activity. The Network is keenly aware of these fears due to varying government and non-
government communications voicing these anxieties. The day-to-day business of the 
Network is rooted in the handling of sensitive, as well as routine, LE and intelligence 
information. Those fusion centers with a tactical arm are also involved with 
investigations and activities that require details to be held out of the general public’s 
reach for operational security purposes. These purposeful public restrictions (of 
information) attribute to perceptions that violations of P/CRCL may be occurring.  
A fusion center’s ability to collect a vast amount of information from disparate 
databases due to its ability to leverage various information holdings from partners (who 
represent a variety of disciplines) is often perceived as a potential risk to P/CRCL. The 
Constitution Project shared its concerns in a 2012 report that the Network raises the risk 
of U.S. citizens being subject to unwarranted scrutiny and suggested that some fusion 
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centers have collected information on constitutionally protected activities.250 They also 
expressed fears that new initiatives dealing with the collection and processing of SAR 
could contribute to retention of information on citizens without passing the reasonable 
suspicion threshold.251 The Brennan Center for Justice claimed that many police 
departments do not have a consistent set of guidelines for the requirements of the use of 
reasonable suspicion.252 
A widely criticized February 2009 bulletin produced by the North Central Texas 
Fusion Center (NCTFC), which described Muslim lobbying groups as potential 
facilitators of creating environments suitable for terrorist operations, has been often cited 
as an example as the Network’s lack of concern for P/CRCL issues.253  The McKinney, 
Texas-based NCTFC’s bulletin identified specific Islamic associations and advocacy 
groups and requested that LEOs encountering any of the identified organizations report 
activities to the NCTFC. The report also referenced and asked for reporting on activities 
of anti-war protest organizations.254 This product was viewed negatively and fostered the 
perception that the Network “endorse(s) discrimination against Muslims” as well as anti-
war activists.255 
The Missouri Information Analysis Center (MIAC) produced a report, which 
discussed the Modern Militia Movement, that was distributed to its LE partners in same 
month and year.256 This document was subsequently leaked to the media and revealed 
what some assessed as reporting which violated P/CRCL standards. MIAC’s document 
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discussed the background and common divisions of the militia movement. It also 
described ideology of the movement’s subsets and organizational intent to include the 
officer safety implications associated with some of the groups that may engage in 
extremist activities against the government. In one portion of the MIAC report, the 
document mentioned political leaders who were commonly held in favor of these 
organizations that drew a majority of the public outrage. The perception from some 
external parties was that the MIAC was suggesting that supporters of these political 
leaders were by association, supporters of anti-government extremism.257 
Another leaked report, this time an assessment produced by the Virginia Fusion 
Center (VFC), was heavily criticized for over exaggerating the terrorism threat to 
Virginia and categorizing different groups and organizations erroneously as potential 
threats.258 VFC’s suggestion that university student groups were considered 
radicalization nodes for extremist groups drew concerns that P/CRCL violations would 
cause a chilling effect on those participating in like organizations. Other negative 
perceptions were drawn from the VFC’s documentation of suspicious activities 
concerning subject photography of critical infrastructure and monuments, as well as 
descriptions of protest events that appeared to have had elements of hate speech included 
in the events.259 
In April 2009, when discussing intelligence reporting received by fusion centers, 
a DHS I&A official claimed, “(SLTT) are collecting open-source intelligence on U.S. 
persons, without proper vetting, and improperly reporting this information through 
homeland information reporting (HIR) channels.”260 Similarly, the ACLU filed a July 
2014 lawsuit on behalf of five individuals against the federal government concerning the 
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collection of SAR data that was submitted as part of the NSI program.261 The complaint 
alleges that the five plaintiffs were each involved in five separate lawful activities, but 
information was collected about them and submitted into federal government 
counterterrorism databases. The complaint further assesses that the Network (and other 
organizations) are routinely involved in the collection of information concerning 
constitutionally protected activities.262 During an interview with the U.S. Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, a DHS I&A official explained that she felt 
that the inappropriate information was most likely due to lack of training and less due to 
disregard for individual privacy.263 In 2011, a DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties representative discussed concerns about SLTT information contained in HIR. 
She felt that DHS I&A’s HIRs were often addressing constitutionally protected activities 
that lacks any direct ties to violent or criminal behavior or addresses groups when single 
individuals in those groups maybe the only ones involved in nefarious activities.264  
In 2011, the ACLU filed a legal complaint against the DOJ, FBI, and NSA 
concerning the collection of SAR for inclusion into the FBI’s eGuardian system.265 The 
eGuardian system is a secured information repository where SAR information can be 
inputted by federal and SLTT partners where it is processed and disseminated to relevant 
parties.266 The ACLU argued that the FBI’s description of SAR was so broad that it 
couple be interpreted by collectors (many SLTT) as normal or protected behavior.267  It 
alleged that SAR programs, such as this, could lead to invasions of privacy and/or 
discriminatory surveillance. Also noted in the complaint was that a similar Department of 
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Defense (DOD) program, which predated eGuardian, violated P/CRCL protections. 
DOD’s TALON system which operated from 2002 to 2007 supported the collection of 
SAR data which was deemed relevant to DOD force protection.268 The TALON program 
was eventually closed down after concerns were raised that information retained in the 
system was deemed to have violated P/CRCL protections.269 
During its 2013 report concerning LEA intelligence activities (to include fusion 
centers), the Brennan center expressed concerns of abuses of P/CRCL.270  The report 
stressed the need for rigorous oversight to ensure protections are intact. They also 
described the decentralized nature of policing in the U.S. (including the Network) has led 
to different operating philosophies and strategies lacking hard unifying rules of conduct. 
The report also stressed the concern of the loosening of reasonable suspicion guidelines 
for LE and the Network, which could lead to future P/CRCL violations.271  
In Monahan and Regan’s study on fusion centers and the fusion process, they 
expressed P/CRCL concerns by simply conducted the analytical process.272 They explain 
that intelligence analysis in a fusion center is the process of making judgments on 
activities where there has been no evidence of wrongdoing in order to project future 
threats. Furthermore they claimed that analysis invites P/CRCL violations such as 
religious and racial profiling.273  
Taylor and Russell point out that the Network’s operations could conflict with the 
nation’s democratic ideals.274 They cite areas of concern, specifically the high rate of 
fusion center management turnover and lack of general oversight, that could contribute to 
uneven performance across the Network. They also express that there appears to be 
limited guidance provided to fusion center staff on what is to be collected as well as how 
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and why subjects become targets of interest in investigations.275 Perceptions that the 
Network ignores the “innocent until proven guilty” standard are cause of great concern.  
Mult-agency integration and collaboration is another area that has raised many P/
CRCL flags in some circles. Ironically, this factor is often used by proponents of the 
Network when attempting to demonstrate the strengths and uniqueness of fusion centers. 
Part of the value proposition of the Network has been its ability to integrate different 
agencies and disciplines into operations. This element often highlights the principles that, 
combining different areas of expertise, creates a space that improves the ability of the 
Network to share information and provide better quality analysis. The premise is that the 
different partners provide connectivity and context that a single agency would not be able 
to do on its own.  
While “two heads are better than one” appears to be a commonsense factor, 
perceptions exist that the integration of different agencies and disciplines may pave the 
way for P/CRCL violations. German and Stanley comment that the Network is part of the 
post 9/11 “surveillance-industrial complex” and state claims that this integration is 
unlawful.276 They argue that private sector participation in fusion center operations is a 
risky proposition. They state that unlike the public sector, the private sector is primarily 
motivated by profit generation, which could cause a private sector company to exploit 
fusion center information to gain a business advantage over competitors. Information 
received by a private partner could be used for retaliatory measures against competitors. 
On the other side of the coin, law enforcement may be able to ascertain information from 
the business community on employees without having to go through normal legal 
processes. These partnerships could foster familiar relationships that provide the Network 
the opportunity to mask its activities or take advantage of the private sector as proxies to 
conduct operations which the government is not authorized to do.277  
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In the same vein as the concern with private sector participation in the Network is 
military participation.278 Issues have surfaced which claim that the LE community has 
undergone a militarization process, which risks confusing practitioners between what has 
traditionally been security and intelligence operations focused on external threats versus 
normal LE and policing activities directed at internal (to the U.S.) actors. Increased 
partnerships between the military and the Network (as well as LE in general) provides the 
potential for LE to have access to military technology not originally intended for 
domestic use.279 The Posse Comitatus Act is often used as a reference point when the 
discussion of military and Network integration comes up.280 The prohibition against 
military participation in LE activities makes this partnership a grey area. The ACLU cites 
an example of the MCAC and the U.S. Army’s collaboration where an active duty service 
member works inside the fusion center, but staff members appeared to be unaware of 
authorizations for this partnership.281 In addition, the ACLU expresses concerns that the 
military and Network partnership has never been properly debated but was implemented 
without consideration of the lawfulness of the partnership.282 
C. ANALYSIS 
Perceptions that the Network is complicit in blatant violations to P/CRCL 
principles are one of the few items that could trigger a complete defunding or significant 
alteration to the Network’s operations. Concerns related to this topic must be viewed by 
the Network practitioners as one of the top priorities. Reports of P/CRCL violations need 
to be promptly addressed. Standing operating procedures need to be backed by sound 
policy and practice in order for the Network to ensure they are in compliance with these 
principles. Review of guidelines and reports of fusion center progress in this category 
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appear that the Network has moved to address these concerns, but more work is required 
to demonstrate this increased focus and progress. 
In April 2010, Global, DHS, and DOJ produced a guideline document intended on 
assisting fusion centers in developing P/CRCL policies across the Network.283 This 
document acted as a template that could be used by fusion centers to create an individual 
policy in compliance with P/CRCL regulations. While there is no blanket policy that 
covers the entire Network, this document is significant because it essentially spurred the 
development of individual fusion center policies and unified these policies by ensuring 
there were consistent procedures and protections put in place.  
After generation of a policy, each fusion center was required to have the policy be 
subject to a review process by DHS to ensure the policies were in compliance through a 
verification process.284 Those fusion centers that were not able to obtain approval from 
DHS were to be deemed ineligible for utilization of Homeland Security Grant Program. 
This grant program is one of the revenue streams used by a majority of the centers to 
fund operations.285  
Additionally, DHS instituted a December 31, 2010 deadline for all primary and 
recognized fusion centers (in operation at that time) to achieve an enhanced capability in 
P/CRCL protections as part of the nationwide 2010 Baseline Capabilities Assessment of 
Fusion Centers.286 This assessment aimed at evaluating the Network’s level of 
achievement in the COCs as well as the ECs (refer to Figure 4 and Figure 5 for 
descriptions), which included P/CRCL protections. Teams of representatives from the 
Office of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, DHS, FBI, as 
well as selected fusion center directors executed the on-site portion of the assessment.287 
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This effort was the first attempt at evaluating the Network’s status of P/CRCL 
protections. P/CRCL evaluation was weaved into the fabric of each of the 2011, 2012, 
and 2013 Final Reports as well.288 
The increased focus on P/CRCL protections has resulted in a significant 
improvement in the implementation of policies across the Network. The North Carolina 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAAC) based in Raleigh, North Carolina 
established its policy, which highlights many areas of its operations.289 The ISAAC 
policy establishes the privacy officer position and explains the organization’s 
responsibilities to review for and respond to P/CRCL violations and complaints. The 
ISAAC also details its efforts to minimize the dissemination of personal identifiable 
information to stakeholders.290  
The Oklahoma Information Fusion Center (OIFC) Privacy Policy is another 
example of the increased attention on P/CRCL protections.291 In the policy, the OIFC 
defines the organization’s responsibilities as well as the fusion center’s operating 
authorities. The OIFC policy highlights redress procedures should P/CRCL complaints 
arise.292  
The Alabama Fusion Center (AFC) Privacy Policy also communicates its focus 
on P/CRCL protections.293 The AFC highlights its processes for the sharing and 
disclosure of information as well as the requirements for the merging of its records. The 
AFC requires all personnel with access to the center’s information technology services to 
comply with the policy.294  
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The 2011 Final Report found that 100 percent of the 72 fusion centers assessed 
had achieved an approved privacy policy that met the ISE Privacy Guidelines.295 
Findings also revealed that 71 of the fusion centers were implementing the policy. In 
addition 44 percent of the fusion centers had not undergone a privacy compliance review 
and only 32 percent had developed an outreach plan to communicate the policy with 
external stakeholders.296 The 2013 surveys revealed increases in this area to 92 percent of 
the Network had conducted the compliance reviews.297 The 2012 Final Report found 
increases in the P/CRCL protections commitment of the Network. Findings indicated that 
there was a 14 point increase totaling 92 percent of the centers were providing P/CRCL 
training to staff members.298 Results also found that 96 percent of the Network had 
implemented a P/CRCL review process for fusion center products prior to 
dissemination.299 As of the 2013 assessment, all but one fusion center conducted P/
CRCL training for staff.300 
The Network has significantly increased its focus on P/CRLC protections, but 
items concerning the staffing of privacy officer positions seem to be one area needing 
improvement. While all but one fusion center was found to have a designated privacy 
officer, 48 percent of fusion centers experienced a turnover in this position in the twelve 
months preceding the 2012 Final Report and 27 percent projected a changeover in the 
position in the following 12 months.301 The projects approved accurate as actual turnover 
of staff in this position was 24 percent in 2013.302 In addition, 87 percent of the privacy 
officers were also reported to have other responsibilities not tied to P/CRCL issues that 
accounted for a majority of their work time.303  
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In order for the Network to combat perceptions that P/CRCL is not a priority, 
fusion centers will need to modify their staffing requirements for their privacy officers. 
Instituting time in position requirements and limiting non-P/CRCL responsibilities of the 
privacy officer would aid in developing a cadre of experienced officers. Implementing 
the above would help in elevating these officers to be viewed as key positions in the 
fusion center and help professionalize the discipline. 
The Network’s lack of focus on conducting outreach to external partners also 
feeds the perception that fusion centers have not attempted to address some of the P/
CRCL indiscretions, such as the ones mentioned previously in this chapter. 
Implementation of a vigorous strategic communication plan focusing on the 
improvements in this area, as well as highlighting the protections now in place, would 
better educate the masses about the focus changes of the Network’s P/CRCL protections. 
Other items that contribute to negative perceptions on this topic which may be 
difficult to overcome concern the nature of the Network’s work. Day-to-day fusion 
centers work with information and intelligence that is deemed sensitive. Investigations 
that the Network is involved in have operational security requirements to ensure the 
safety of personnel involved in the investigations. Those that are subject to investigations 
of criminal activity cannot be privy to the investigation itself for fear that the activity 
being investigated is not further concealed, thereby complicating intelligence and law 
enforcement efforts. Information provided and operations conducted by many of the 
partner federal agencies have classification restrictions. All of these factors amount to a 
culture of secrecy which is rooted in legal and statutory regulations. These requirements 
present a significant challenge for the Network in the area of P/CRCL.  
Striking a balance between transparency and security will be required to stave off 
false perceptions of intentional wrong-doing by the Network. Sound and visible 
oversight, compliance with regulations, and direct engagement with P/CRCL advocates 




The Network has undergone unprecedented growth and change since its inception 
in the early 2000s. As with any program or initiative, continued refinement of operations 
and innovation is required to keep pace with the changing landscape and in the case of 
the Network, evolving adversary threat. Fusion centers have experienced both success 
and failure during their development and maturity phase. This chapter provides a 
summary of recommendations for consideration by the Network and its allied partners, 
such as DHS and DOJ, in order to enhance its ability to educate decision makers and 
external partners on its operations and capabilities. These recommendations also aim to 
identify areas of program improvement which will help the Network better determine its 
strategic direction. 
Reporting, reviews, assessments, and commentary on the Network indicate that 
many of the supporters of the Network have direct ties to fusion centers. Examples of 
such would be in the case of the 2011, 2012, 2013 final reports on the fusion centers, 
which were largely produced by DHS.304 DHS has a vested interest in the success of the 
Network as one of the main federal agencies responsible for information sharing between 
SLTT partners, and it could be subject to biases in its reporting. These reports do tend to 
be based on more defined metrics and identify areas of improvement based on empirical 
data. Many parties that appear to heavily criticize fusion centers appear also appear to 
have motivations tied to political leanings or special interest agendas. An obvious 
example of this would be the ACLU report titled What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers.305 
Reporting such as this provides relevant content and voices valid concerns, yet does not 
provide a balanced view that contributes to its findings. Overall, there appears to be 
declining support for the Network. (Table 5 provides an overview of perceptions of the 
Network.) 
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Network Perception Summary 
Elements Description Criticisms Analysis 
Administration The Network 
governance, oversight, 
authorities, discipline 







structure and lacks 
external oversight 
Jurisdictional 
boundaries and lines 
of authority prevent a 
single centralized 
command. A majority 





One of the Network’s 
primary business 
functions is to conduct 
thoughtful and 
meaningful intelligence 











products are too 
general and of low 
value to the 
consumer. 
Analytical capacity is 
increasing. Strategic 
intelligence is often 




from lack of 
understanding of the 
intent of products.  
Information 
Sharing 
The Network’s ability to 
inform and connect 
partner agencies with 
information to guide 
operations and decision 
making. 
The Network often 
shares information 
that is redundant 








policies are now in 
place to formalize the 








vetting of data. 




requirements, as well as 
the organization’s self-
view of its 
responsibilities 
The Network lacks 
a strategic view and 
has migrated from a 



















transparency and ability 
to execute protections 
for citizen privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties 
The Network lacks 
transparency, is a 
risk to individual P/
CRCL, and 
operates on broad 
definitions of SAR 
and reasonable 
suspicion. 
The entire Network 
recently attained 
integrated P/CRCL 
policies across the 
nation, but has 
struggled with 
turnover and 
completion of updated 
compliance reviews. 
Table 5.   Network Perception Summary 
A. MARKETING STRATEGY 
One of the first priorities of the Network, which will be required to in order to 
increase the chances of the organization’s survival, will be to demonstrate its value, 
communicate its objectives, and to better explain what makes the organization successful. 
This can most effectively be done by organizing and executing a coordinated marketing 
campaign to communicate the Network’s efforts. While many variables are contributing 
to diminished support, the current lack of a strategic marketing plan that brands the 
Network is significantly negatively impacting perceptions of the organization. The 
Network may be suffering from erroneous ideas about its intentions and as Hackett 
claims “wrong opinion can trigger an investigation.”306 The Network can apply lessons 
learned in industry concerning marketing and public relations in order to overcome some 
of the negative perceptions that may have been rooted in lack of understanding of fusion 
centers. 
Marchand describes unintended organizational benefits of public relations that 
were realized by AT&T, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and General Electric 
which helped further their business models.307 Fatayerji explains that product marketing 
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helps get products (or ideas) to the customer and helps convince them to buy.308 The 
Network is selling its ability to enhance public safety to the general population and is 
offering capabilities that act as force multipliers to those organizations participating in the 
security of the homeland. Better advertising the Network’s successes and activities would 
increase awareness. Getting customers to “buy” its products in this case would mean that 
constituents understand the Network’s mission, be able to differentiate fusion centers 
from other counterterrorism efforts, as well as have awareness on successful fusion center 
activities. Some marketing challenges for the Network that needs to be considered 
involves information and operational security as fusion centers routinely deal with 
sensitive intelligence.309 Strategic communications that also address the intelligence 
cycle and investigative process, which explains how and why some areas of the Network 
are restricted, may alleviate some of the concerns that stem from nondisclosure of 
information. 
The National Fusion Center Association (NFCA) would be integral in 
coordinating this campaign.310 The NFCA states some of its main purposes as providing 
an independent voice for the Network, representing fusion centers by educating the 
federal government on activities, and advocating for commitment of resources for the 
Network.311 The NFCA as the lead entity would need to collaborate with DHS as well as 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, which has assisted the 
fusion centers and DHS in the development of guidelines and technical assistance 
programs for the Network.312 In addition to collaboration with federal partners, the 
NFCA should mobilize the cadre of the Governors Homeland Security Advisors Council 
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to help articulate how the Network has improved security efforts at individual state 
level.313 A combined campaign utilizing the organizations mentioned above would aid in 
the delivery of fusion center messaging at various levels of government.  
B. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE NETWORK OF FUSION CENTERS 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the Network has suffered some negative 
perceptions concerning its operations, organization, and mission. From an external (to the 
Network) perspective, it appears that this organization is very loosely affiliated and is 
aimlessly wandering. The Network may seem that it is attempting to determine its 
mission space and decide how it best fits into the National Security Strategy.314 At 
macro-level, one might assess the Network as dozens of fusion centers that operate 
differently and happen to coordinate with each other at times. In some aspects, this is 
what the Network has been experiencing, if just not to the exaggerated degree that is 
often perceived. 
From the perspective mentioned above, a likely assessment may be that 
uniformity in structure and operations should be the desired end state. Moving the 
Network to a more centralized structure, which would mostly likely consist of a leading 
federal agency, would make it far easier to assess fusion centers capabilities. This model 
would address much of the angst surrounding differing mission statements, oversight 
issues, as well as many others criticisms. One obstacle to this approach is that each of the 
fusion centers are independently owned by a SLTT organization operating under its own 
authorities.  
Another item to consider is that a decentralized structure prevents single points of 
failure and fosters an environment of innovation. While the fusion centers have evolved 
in some ways independently of each other, they are bound together by their shared 
overarching goal to help in protecting the homeland. Some fusion centers have 
specialized in different areas due to local and/or regional needs. Certain parts of the 
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Network have excelled in accomplishing specific tasks, while other parts have created 
opportunities to reinforce success with respect to analysis, operations, and investigation.  
The development of a National national strategy for the National Network of 
Fusion Centers (STRATNET) would increase the functionality and help the Network 
better integrate. STRATNET would provide a balance between the advantages of a total 
decentralized and “top-down” organizational structure as a byproduct. The creation of a 
policy, such as STRATNET, is required to obtain better alignment of the Network’s 
operations. The House also recognized this deficiency in its 2013 report on fusion 
centers.315 This report identified that the development of an item such as STRATNET is 
necessary for future operations of the Network. To go a step further, they also suggested 
that the federal government should develop a fusion center strategy which would guide 
federal agency interaction and support to the Network.316 
STRATNET should be created in a collaborative environment to ensure it meets 
the needs and intent of all parties that have equities in the Network, the information 
sharing, and the domestic intelligence domains. Representatives from DHS, DOJ, NFCA, 
FBI, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Offices of the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Governors Homeland Security Advisors Council, fusion centers, as well 
as the White House, are likely co-authors for STRATNET. A coordinated policy 
generated from those listed above would help ensure buy-in at all levels of government 
and offer the best chance for a well-rounded strategy. At a minimum, STRATNET would 
have elements which address the following; 
 Current goals 




 Performance measures 
 Funding 
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 Fusion center requirements 
 Administrative 
 Analysis / assessment 
 Training 
 Certification  
 Domestic intelligence / Information Sharing Environment 
 P/CRCL guidelines 
 Baseline capabilities 
 Marketing 
 Fusion center uniqueness 
 Organizational structure 
STRATNET is an essential next step for the Network and should be given the 
highest priority. Many fusion center’s efforts up to this point have been attempts at 
achieving relatively more tactical requirements. Examples of this are obtainment of 
individual baseline capabilities, development of a required policy such as P/CRCL, or the 
creation of an analytical product which is multi-sealed. The Network needs to channel its 
focus on STRATNET. Fusion centers need to help define what makes a fusion center, 
what direction the Network should go, how certain capabilities are obtained, and what 
defines success for the Network or fusion center. The Network will struggle and decision 
makers will continue to be confounded until the creation of an item, such as STRATNET, 
helps to tell the story of fusion centers. 
C. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FOCUSES 
As described in further detail in Chapter IV, there are varying opinions on the 
Network’s ability to conduct quality analysis and produce intelligence products that are 
deemed of high value. Some of the factors that have complicated this area of 
responsibility are consistent certification training for analysts, a Network customer base, 
which is largely focused on tactical operations, and policymaker awareness on the 
potential value of strategic intelligence. 
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1. Analyst Training 
In many areas of the Network, analysts enter the analytical field lacking any 
structured background in the discipline. Often, new analysts enter the fusion center as a 
new employee, some may be transferred from a traditional LE oriented position, and 
some could have experienced their position being evolved from a data analysis or data 
processing to an analyst. Training programs vary at each fusion center, and there are 
many training programs available to analysts; however, there is no formal consensus 
across the Network that identifies an accreditation process or programs that represent the 
“approved” analyst certification course.  
In order to professionalize analytical cadre, the Network will be required to 
institute a formal path for the training and development of intelligence analysts. The 
Network will have to build a consensus across the organization and may consider 
utilizing DOJ and DHS resources and expertise to unify this effort. The DHS Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) has the institutional knowledge, resources, 
and expertise that could aid the Network in this effort. The FLETC Training Research 
Office specializes in evaluating, researching, and developing programs of various 
topics.317 The Network and FLETC would be able to engage state training certification 
entities, DHS I&A, and other relevant intelligence community partners in order to 
develop the standards and curriculum for an accredited analyst training program or 
determine if programs currently in use can be accredited and offered in a more inclusive 
manner.  
2. Tactical Focus 
Because the majority of the day-to-day customers of the Network’s products have 
a tactical focus, fusion centers need to continue to enhance their capability to produce 
items that look through the tactical intelligence lens. Topics on items that involve officer 
safety concerns, situational awareness, and raw tactical intelligence will positively 
influence the perceptions of the Network’s value. Dahl explains that tactical intelligence 
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is more specified or focused on an information need and is most often consumed by 
junior-level officials participating in operational planning.318  
If individual fusion centers maintain a focus on support to operations, another 
positive by-product would be an increase in information received by stakeholders. 
Supporting operations will ensure these recipients are thereby feeding the center back the 
results of operations and investigations in the form of raw information. This information 
acts as the raw materials to conduct analysis. The influx of this information will also aid 
the Network in determining the information requirements and operational priorities of the 
field elements.  
A generic example of this process might be initiated by an officer who contacts a 
fusion center for a name check on a subject of interest. The fusion center receives the 
request and is also providing the context or justification for the screening of the subject. 
The results are provided back to the officer, and the officer subsequently provides the 
result of the encounter or investigation to the fusion center. The fusion center may now 
be in the position to redact the information and forward out an awareness product to other 
stakeholders informing them generically of the incident requesting any information of 
like encounters. Other stakeholders review the information and some respond with 
additional information on similar events in their jurisdictions. At this point, the fusion 
center is in possession of reporting that is greater than the sum of its parts and may be 
able to make an assessment on the activity. Maintaining a tactical focus will ensure that 
line officers, detectives, as well as lower to mid-level public safety partners find value in 
the Network and will continue to promote the services offered by fusion centers. 
3. Strategic Focus 
Strategic intelligence is often viewed as the gold standard for analysis. This 
category is less focused, broader, and often covers a longer time horizon. Dahl claims 
that strategic intelligence is often valued most by senior decision and policymakers.319 
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Unlike the fusion center partners mentioned above, this category of fusion center 
stakeholders plan and focus on longer range goals and objectives. The Network will be 
required to make a concerted effort to put a premium on the production of strategic 
intelligence in order to demonstrate its value to executive leaders.  
Some individual fusion centers may be required to divide their analytical 
structures into current and strategic intelligence divisions or tactical and strategic 
partitions. In many cases, a fusion center analyst may be required to focus both on 
tactical and strategic analysis. Most of that analyst’s time is spent mired on the former 
focus of responding to immediate incidents and requests. This setting complicates the 
ability of the individual to be able to obtain sound strategic expertise on the topic of 
interest where that analyst may be required to provide a long-range assessment on that 
topic. This is not an argument to completely segregate tactical analysts from strategic 
analysts, since cross pollination of skills, ideas, and information from each specialty is a 
requirement of success. The intent is to highlight that strategic expertise often requires 
longer, in-depth research that is hindered if it is regularly interrupted by tactical 
requirements.  
It is not just that the Network needs to further develop its ability to conduct 
strategic intelligence production, but it will also need to educate its would-be consumers 
of the potential value of and how to use strategic intelligence. If the Network was able to 
prep the field by explaining the intelligence cycle process to external leaders, this would 
increase the receptivity of decision makers with regard to receiving products from the 
Network. This process would most likely also establish a dialogue between leaders and 
fusion centers, which would help articulate the information requirements from these 
individuals as well.  
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
A. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE AREAS OF CONTENTION 
In the near to mid-term, the Network will continue to face challenges concerning 
the opinions of its utility and performance. Even with the implementation of a marketing 
campaign, creation of a national strategy, and honing of its tactical through strategic 
analytical capabilities, perceptions of the Network will take some time to change. Some 
areas of concern can be improved but will not be able to be completely overcome due to 
the nature of the Network’s discipline.  
One example of this is in the P/CRCL category. The Network can and should 
strive to be as transparent as possible and execute in accordance with the prescribed 
privacy protections policies. Privacy officers to the greatest extent possible should be free 
from adjacent responsibilities and be free to communicate with leadership on items that 
impact this area. All products need to be thoroughly reviewed by the fusion center 
privacy officer for any items that could violate P/CRCL protection principles. Training 
should regularly be provided to staff on this topic to ensure the entire Network cadre is 
aware of the concerns and potential pitfalls. The need for certain areas of secrecy and 
information sensitivity means the Network will never be able to achieve a level of 
transparency with P/CRCL protection advocates and the public that is needed to alleviate 
all of the concerns in this category. Regular communication and strict adherence to P/
CRCL standards to ensure no future violations occur is the Network’s best strategy in 
“managing” perceptions here. 
Another challenge that the Network will continue to face, due to many variables 
such as the declining budget and competition from other organizations, is to demonstrate 
its uniqueness from other initiatives. The FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), 
located in 103 cities across the nation, are heavily involved with the investigation of 
terrorism investigations.320 These organizations have a distinct mission from the fusion 
                                                 
320. “Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, accessed June 1, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs. 
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centers but have areas that sometimes overlap. There has often been confusion between 
the Network’s and JTTF’s counterterrorism responsibilities, which possibly stems from 
an inability by third parties to discern the distinction of these roles and the multi-agency 
composition of each entity. The Network has also been viewed as a redundant capability 
to the JTTF and funding has been brought into question due to this. The Network’s best 
strategy to engage this potential problem is to ensure elements of the marketing campaign 
communicate the distinct capabilities and successes of fusion centers. The Network needs 
to be aware of these areas of current and future contention and take aggressive action to 
mitigate the concerns.  
B. POTENTIAL AREAS OF FURTHER INQUIRY AND NEED FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis attempts to examine areas concerning the functions and operations of 
the Network which have caused varied perceptions from observers. As the nation moves 
farther way from 9/11 and experiences new priorities that focuses on items that do not 
concern terrorism, the Network will need continue to mature and broaden its priorities on 
topics that continue to be of significance to the nation. It will need to continue this 
process of maturation while still holding true to its roots in the counterterrorism role. 
Future research concerning what threat vectors are relevant for fusion center focus may 
aid the Network in identifying strategic priorities.  
Further inquiry on marketing and branding for the Network would support this 
area that currently lacks significant data. There currently is a massive amount of research 
on product marketing and organizational branding for private sector services and 
business, but exploration into specific guidance for how the Network can implement a 
campaign would be significantly beneficial to future implementation. 
Lastly, additional inquiry and exploration into how the Network is actually 
performing would be valuable to fusion centers and decision makers alike. Research that 
seeks to determine and better define what the Network is rated on, resulting in concrete 
performance measures, would contribute to the national assessments of the Network. 
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Better metrics would result in making these assessments more meaningful to participants 
and those executives responsible for the operation and the funding of fusion centers.  
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The National Network of Fusion Centers is an organization on the move; the 
expansion to the current 78 fusion centers has caused significant growing pains and 
unprecedented successes. In the relatively short period of time since its inception, the 
Network has demonstrated significant innovation and willingness to progress and adhere 
to prescribed recommendations. The Network will need to rely on its creativity and 
flexibility to continue to mature and achieve greater levels of success. In order for fusion 
centers to achieve their unrealized potential, the Network and its partners will also need 
to implement mitigation strategies in order to address areas of concern.  
Previous terrorist attacks against the homeland provided the emphasis required to 
demonstrate the need to collaborate with others.321 Another item that contributed to the 
development of the Network were the unified efforts by partner organizations to define 
structure, roles, shared mission space, as well as guiding principles.322 Lastly, the 
Network’s continued success has relied on the development and use of trusted 
partnerships which act as the mortar to the bricks of the Network.323 These elements that 
shaped the Network will continue to be relevant in the future. Fusion centers should 
continue to foster these relationships and pursue efforts of expansion to better connect the 
Network to stakeholders. 
Establishment of a marketing campaign and coordinating strategic 
communications which cite factors that have contributed to the creation and maturation of 
the Network would address some of these criticisms. Marketing would also brand the 
Network and educate the public on how the Network supports the defense of the 
homeland. Branding of the Network in a manner that demonstrates the organization’s 
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uniqueness and contributions to the defense of the homeland would diminish questions of 
the entity’s usefulness to the National Security Strategy.324 
While the Network has advanced in a positive direction since its inception, parts 
of the organization are viewed as performing in an unequal manner. Concrete centralized 
uniformity is not ideal for this entity, but a more federated method or blue print for future 
operations would help the Network gain favorable results. The formulation of a National 
Strategy for Fusion Centers would provide a road map for the Network and establish a 
clear direction to better move each fusion center in a central direction without the centers 
sacrificing their unique strengths or abandoning their localized priorities. 
Further enhancement of the Network’s analytic capabilities would help validate 
fusion center’s ability to produce and provide relevant information to the right customer 
at the right time. The diverse levels of analyst experience across the Network have led to 
an assortment of products of varying value. This has contributed to the perceptions that 
the Network is nonessential to the homeland security mission. Establishment of a training 
certification program coupled with stakeholder education and outreach will help with the 
generation of quality products which are consumed in the manner in which they are 
intended. Additionally, the Network will need to continue to raise its capabilities 
regarding tactical intelligence support and move to make a concerted effort to institute 
analytical policies and practices focusing on strategic intelligence support in order to 
exhibit value to senior decision makers.  
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